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ABSTRACT 
To operate effectively and maintain national security, the DoD relies on the ability to 
ensure authorized access to information, while protecting that information from 
unauthorized users.  Non-malicious insider threats involving information leakage 
typically receive little attention, though their impact is significant.  This thesis focuses on 
how the act of file sharing contributes to non-malicious insider threats.  Current file 
sharing methods provide neither the usability users require nor the security the 
organization requires.  Security without usability results in users bypassing securing 
features, and systems that are usable but not secure are invariably compromised.  
Therefore, usability and security must be properly aligned to attain true security.  Cloud-
based file sharing technologies provide promising alternatives for both usable and secure 
file sharing.  As the federal government moves toward the cloud, new programs assess 
the back-end security of commercially available cloud-based technologies.  Building on 
prior research, this thesis develops a methodology for evaluating the usability and 
security of cloud-based file sharing technologies from the end-user perspective.  This 
methodology adapts and combines the concepts of heuristics evaluation and cognitive 
walkthrough.  Specifically, the heuristics evaluation assesses whether a cloud-based file 
sharing technology implements critical usability and security principles, and the cognitive 
walkthrough determines how usably the principles are implemented.  The thesis 
concludes with a demonstration of how the methodology is conducted.   The results of 
this methodology will assist organizations in properly assessing a technology for official 
use by DoD. 
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A. PROBLEM, PURPOSE AND METHODS 
The ability for an organization’s employees to share information and collaborate 
in its production is of critical importance.  Particularly in the military, success on the 
battlefield depends on the ability to share information, yet the current file sharing 
capabilities afforded to Department of Defense (DoD) employees are either not secure, 
not usable, or neither secure nor usable.  This lack of usable security exacerbates the non-
malicious insider threat to DoD information systems.  As a consequence, unintended data 
breaches resulting from this threat degrade the security posture of DoD networks. 
This thesis seeks to understand how the lack of usability with the DoD’s currently 
approved file sharing security measures and policies leads to increased residual security 
risk for DoD information systems.  This thesis examines current DoD IA policies to show 
options available to employees (i.e., insiders) to securely store and share files, and shows 
these policies are cumbersome and difficult to follow.  Legacy methods are used, 
including e-mail and removable media (thumb drives, disks, etc.), but they are not secure 
and do not scale.  On an enterprise level, e.g., within the DoD, sharing solutions exist that 
incorporate Microsoft SharePoint or shared drives on a Storage Area Network (SAN), but 
they have profound problems in terms of interoperability, usability, and deployability.  
Cloud-based file storage and sharing solutions have developed over the past few years 
into what promises to be a possible replacement for legacy file sharing mechanisms.  
Still, it is uncertain whether cloud-based solutions can meet the security and scalability 
requirements for the DoD. 
The ultimate purpose of this thesis is to evaluate solutions that bridge the gap 
between usability and security in a way that will create a truly secure solution for DoD 
employees.  As file-sharing requirements are not unique to DoD, the concepts found in 
this thesis may apply generally to other sectors of society.   
To achieve its purpose, this thesis develops an evaluation methodology for 
assessing the usability and security of cloud-based file sharing technologies.  This 
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methodology includes a heuristics evaluation, based on numerous usability and security 
principles needed for secure file sharing, and a cognitive walkthrough of the most 
promising of the alternatives.  Finally, a demonstration of this methodology shows how 
the methodology can be applied in order to find a solution capable of filling an 
organization’s needs.   
B. UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT 
DoD information technology (IT) security professionals are the defenders of 
critical defense-related systems, positioned on a virtual perimeter and waging a battle 
both to protect and to provide access to an organization’s information.  They must fully 
understand and anticipate both external and internal threats to their IT systems.  An 
“outsider” in the cyber context is defined generally as an individual who has not been 
granted authorized access to an organization’s information systems.  Enemy outsiders 
will attempt to exploit an information system without authorized access, i.e., by working 
around or overcoming existing security measures.  Conversely, “insiders” have been 
granted some level of authorized access to an organization’s information systems.  The 
threats posed from insiders can be broken down into two categories: malicious and non-
malicious.  Malicious insiders intentionally exploit an information system to harm the 
organization for personal gain, e.g., financial or political.  Non-malicious insiders, on the 
other hand, are those with authorized access to information who harm the information 
system without any intention of causing damage to the organization or its systems.   
Much research has been dedicated to understanding the “who, what, and why” of 
cyber threats.  But the focus of research with respect to these types of insider threats has 
been unbalanced.  Outsider and malicious insider threats have received the majority of 
security research focus, while far less research has been done to understand and address 
the actions of the non-malicious insider, often perceived as less significant.  One 
researcher attributes this lack of alarm to the human tribal instinct, where organizations 
want to believe that their own members can be trusted (Lynch, 2006).  Overlooking the 
threat of non-malicious insiders can be detrimental.  Most analyses of data breaches 
indicate that the majority originates with non-malicious insiders.  For example, the 
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Privacy Rights Clearinghouse indicated that 87% of all data loss resulting from insider 
actions was attributable to non-malicious insiders (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2011).  
Other studies have reported that data loss due to negligent insiders account for 40–70% of 
all data breaches (Lynch, 2006).   
The costs associated with non-malicious data breaches are especially high (Cisco, 
2008).  Foremost among these are external costs to the individual or organization if the 
leaked information is intercepted and exploited by an outside adversary.  Fortunately, this 
consequence is not always certain, as information leaked does not always make it into 
malicious hands.  However, there are internal costs associated with information breaches, 
such as the significant administrative costs in time and money to find and repair a 
vulnerability created by the breach.  As well, when PII is leaked there are time costs in 
contacting victims of the breach, as well as money costs in providing identity theft 
remediation.  When sensitive information is leaked, there are productivity costs when 
network accounts must be shut down and protected or scrubbed, computers must be 
seized, and users are unable to conduct operations for a period of time.  These external 
and internal costs can lead to a reputational cost for the organization as well. 
C. NON-MALICIOUS INSIDER MOTIVATION 
In light of these assertions, cyber defenders are likely to ask themselves why so 
many well-intentioned employees are causing such damage to their organizations.  The 
explanation is the organization’s failure to align usability and security.  The potential for 
real damage, or the inadvertent creation of a new vulnerability, exists every time a well-
intentioned user must circumvent an organization’s security policies to get work done.  
Understanding why non-malicious insiders choose to circumvent security is the key to 
stopping such bad behavior.  
Though they may not understand the severity of the threat, most organizations, 
including the DoD, recognize that non-malicious insiders pose some level of risk.  Thus, 
organizations try to attack the problem with stronger security policies, such as more 
robust user training, auditing, and forcing users to adopt longer passwords.  Such policies 
are meant to prevent users’ bad actions before they happen, and auditing is intended to 
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catch bad behaviors after the fact.  However, even with these countermeasures in place, 
the non-malicious insider threat continues to cause significant data breaches.  These 
countermeasures are ineffective as they treat only the symptoms of the problem by 
addressing the individual actions that result in such behavior.  They do not mitigate the 
cause of the threat, i.e., the circumstances that lead non-malicious insiders to circumvent 
security in the first place.  If we can identify and eliminate these circumstantial factors, 
we can reduce their occurrence.   
Numerous psychological and human factors drive non-malicious insiders to 
circumvent security measures; however, this study will focus on technology rather than 
psychology.  On a technological level, one predominant motivator for security control 
circumvention stands out among the rest: when security mechanisms are too difficult for 
employees to use.  If following a particular security measure makes it significantly harder 
for an employee to do his or her job, the chances are far greater that the employee will 
choose not to follow or abide by the measure.   
D. THE THREAT OF UNUSABLE SECURITY 
The idea that security mechanisms can be difficult to follow is not a new concept.  
There is a popular belief among users of technology that the terms “usability” and 
“security” are opposing forces that must be balanced.  Usability refers generally to “the 
extent to which the users of products are able to work effectively, efficiently and with 
satisfaction” (International Organization for Standardization [ISO], 1998).  Alternately, 
information security, known as information assurance (IA) by DoD, refers to “measures 
that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their 
availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation” (Committee 
on National Security Systems [CNSS], 2010).  Usability and security are thought to be at 
odds because there are few examples of the two properties being aligned.  Most software, 
to date, has had either poor usability, poor security, or both.  Both usability and security 
mechanisms add complexity to a system and should be designed in from the beginning, 
yet are often implemented as an afterthought by developers (Garfinkel, 2005).  Not  
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surprisingly, the belief persists that if a system must be highly secured, it will not be very 
usable.  Conversely, it is believed if a system is required to be usable, it cannot be highly 
secure.   
From these opposing views comes one of the greatest motivators for the non-
malicious insider: the need to circumvent security measures that are too difficult to use.  
To address this motivator, recent IA research has begun to focus more directly on making 
security mechanisms of information systems more usable.  From this research the concept 
of HCI-SEC (Human Computer Interface and Security), a field of study dedicated to 
addressing the need for both usability and security in the development of end user 
applications, has emerged.  
This thesis follows HCI-SEC beliefs and argues that one cannot achieve truly 
secure systems when the usability and/or security of a system is lacking.  True security 
can only be realized through improving both the usability and the security of the 
information system (Cranor & Garfinkel, 2005).  Systems that are highly secure but not 
very usable result in users bypassing the prescribed security features.  Alternatively, 
highly usable systems that are not very secure are invariably compromised. Unless 
principles of usability and security are aligned, true cyber security cannot be achieved.  
E. THE FILE-SHARING THREAT 
One common IT task for which usability and security remain at odds within 
computer enterprises is file sharing.  Employees have a personal and professional need to 
share information with one other, and to move information between multiple systems.  
Teams must collaborate on documents, subordinates must provide reports to superiors, 
and employees want or need to transfer files between home and office so they can work 
from multiple locations.  These files must be shared and transferred in a secure manner.  
Here, our two requirements are apparent: Employees want to easily share files (usability) 
while the organization needs to protect these files (security).  An employee’s need for the 
most usable solution will often drive him to share files over unsecured means.  For this 
reason, file sharing remains one of the greatest contributors to non-malicious insider 
threats.  According to the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, data breaches resulting from file 
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sharing through portable devices and unintended disclosure (e.g., sent to the wrong 
person via e-mail, fax, mail, etc.) led to approximately 34% of all reported data loss.  In 
the government sector alone, these factors add up to an overwhelming 96% of reported 
data loss (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2011).  These results would seem to indicate 
that the inability to share files securely results in a significant risk for information 
systems, particularly in the federal government.   
F. THESIS OUTLINE 
The organization of this thesis is as follows:   
 Chapter II presents a background on the research area showing how the 
DoD’s current IA policies address insider threats.  Additionally, the 
chapter provides a literature review focusing on major research conducted 
that contributes to a better understanding of the motivation behind non-
malicious insider threats and the usability and security of file sharing. 
Finally, research supporting the evaluation methodologies developed in 
this thesis will be introduced.   
 Chapter III provides important background information specifically 
addressing file sharing practices.  Three basic functional requirements of a 
unified file sharing system are described.  The historical evolution of 
popular file sharing technologies is presented, with an evaluation of the 
limitations of these legacy systems.  Cloud-based file sharing is introduced 
along with a description of how the DoD is moving towards managing its 
IT infrastructure in the cloud.  
 Chapter IV presents an evaluation methodology for assessing the usability 
and security of cloud-based file sharing technologies.  This methodology 
involves a combination of heuristics evaluation and cognitive 
walkthrough.  Ten heuristics are presented that are tailored to specifically 
address the usability and security of cloud-based file sharing systems. 
Three personas and ten tasks are developed as inputs to conduct a 
cognitive walkthrough tailored to further evaluate the usability and 
security of cloud-based file sharing technologies.  
 Chapter V employs the usability and security evaluation methodology 
developed in Chapter IV to demonstrate how an evaluation should be 
conducted.  Three popular cloud-based file sharing technologies are 
evaluated in an example heuristics evaluation.  A cognitive walkthrough 
further demonstrates, using the personas and tasks developed in Chapter 
IV, the learnability and usability of the security features of an example 
technology.  Finally, this chapter concludes with the results of the 
demonstrated evaluation showing how the three example technologies 
 7
implement the principles of usability and security required for truly secure 
file storage and sharing solutions. 
 Chapter VI concludes with a summary of the thesis by reiterating the 
impact that un-usable file sharing systems can have on motivating the non-
malicious insider to degrade an organization’s security posture, and how 
the evaluation methodology developed in this thesis can be used to assess 
whether a solution properly aligns the principles of usability and security 
in its user interface. Additionally, recommendations for future research are 
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II. BACKGROUND RESEARCH AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. THE NEED FOR USABLE AND SECURE FILE SHARING 
Stewart (1997) stated that “knowledge has become the preeminent economic 
resource—more important than raw material; more important, often, than money.”   
Information has become a primary contributor of business success in the digital age 
through advances in knowledge flow over internal networks, and across the Internet. 
The importance of information is particularly true within the DoD, whose 
“business” is to ensure the national security of the United States by providing “military 
forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of our country” (Department of 
Defense [DoD], 2012a).  To accomplish this mission, the DoD employs the largest 
workforce of any single organization in the country: 2.5 million active service members 
at 5,000 sites around the globe (DoD, 2012a).  The IT infrastructure to support such a 
large organization includes over 15,000 networks and seven million computing devices 
(DoD, 2011).  Proper command and control of such a vast IT enterprise requires the 
ability to collaborate on information across a multitude of networks and devices.  But 
unlike most private organizations, the DoD’s ability to make timely decisions on sharing 
information can mean the difference between life or death.  To accentuate its need for 
information flow, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review acknowledged that “there is no 
exaggerating our dependence on DoD’s information networks for command and control 
of our forces, the intelligence and logistics on which they depend, and the weapons 
technologies we develop and field” (DoD, 2010). 
To ensure superiority over its enemies, the DoD must maintain the ability to make 
command and control decisions faster than its adversaries (DoD, 2007a).  The acts of 
gathering, storing, sharing, and collaborating on information play a critical role in the 
decision-making process.  Consequently, information sharing and processing are vital to 
the DoD’s successfully accomplishing its “business” of maintaining national security.   
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B. INFORMATION ASSURANCE IN THE DOD 
The ability to easily share information helps a business thrive, but information 
leaks to unauthorized personnel can cause a business to collapse.  Within the DoD, efforts 
to secure information and ensure its integrity and availability comprise the DoD IA 
program.  
1. DoD Policy Defining Information Assurance 
The DoD has published policies and instructions to ensure that IA is maintained 
across its networks.  DoD Directive (DoDD) 8500.01E, Information Assurance (IA), is 
the parent document to numerous service-level policies, standards, and guidelines 
regarding the establishment of IA (DoD, 2007b).  This directive defines top-level policies 
governing IA across all military services and DoD agencies, as well as assigning 
responsibilities to individuals across DoD departments in order to ensure that these 
policies are followed (DoD, 2007b).  Concomitantly, DoD Instruction (DoDI) 8500.2, 
Information Assurance (IA) Implementation, takes the policies and responsibilities 
prescribes by DoDD 8500.01E, and directs the implementation of security controls for 
information systems operating on any DoD attached network or service (DoD, 2003).  
Together, these documents form the IA foundation for DoD information systems.  These 
documents are important considerations to this thesis’ efforts to understand the security 
implications behind file sharing within the DoD. 
When considering security of DoD systems, it is important to understand that 
some IT risk is unavoidable.  It is simply not possible to implement and enforce IA 
measures that completely mitigate all IT risk.  The goal of DoD policy is therefore to 
balance risk against cost, staffing levels, training requirements, and impact on mission.   
Taking into account these limitations, DoDD 8500.01E requires “an appropriate 
level” of IA that balances the security of sensitivity information against cost 
effectiveness.  Instead of risk elimination, enforcing IA across the DoD is a matter of risk 
management, i.e., a process of “identifying risk, assessing risk, and taking the steps to 
reduce risk to an acceptable level” (Stoneburner, Goguen, & Feringa, 2002, p. 1).   
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The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 
(SP) 800-30 enacts guidelines for managing IT-related risk and is applicable to all federal 
organizations that process sensitive information (Stoneburner et al., 2002).  It defines 
threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts as key elements that must be understood to properly 
manage risk.  In particular, “risk is a function of the likelihood of a given threat-source’s 
exercising a particular potential vulnerability, and the resulting impact of that adverse 
event on the organization” (Stoneburner et al., 2002, p. 8).    
Security controls are measures “that have been implemented, or are planned for 
implementation, by the organization to minimize or eliminate the likelihood (or 
probability) of a threat’s exercising a system vulnerability” (Stoneburner et al., 2002, 
p. 19).  As it is unreasonable to eliminate all risk, residual risk describes the risk 
remaining after new or enhanced security controls are implemented (Stoneburner et al., 




Figure 1.   Summary of the elements of risk 
Figure 1 depicts how security controls can be implemented by the organization to 
mitigate the overall risk to information.  Applying security controls specifically to known 
threats, vulnerabilities, or their impacts will ultimately reduce the system’s residual risk.  
The ability to store and share files introduces vulnerabilities that must be 
understood in order to apply the appropriate controls that mitigate their associated risk.  
This thesis adheres to NIST SP 800-30 guidance to properly evaluate the severity of 
vulnerabilities present in current file sharing and collaboration solutions, and ultimately 
recommends solutions that most effectively minimize IT risks to DoD networks.  
In recent years, the DoD has seen an overwhelming need to strengthen its 
defenses in cyberspace, in order to protect the information it shares across this realm.  
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The 2010 United States (U.S.) National Security Strategy stated, “cybersecurity threats 
represent one of the most serious national security, public safety, and economic 
challenges we face as a nation” (White House, 2010, p. 27).  In response, the DoD has 
increased its focus on the war within cyberspace by establishing “Cyber” as a stand-alone 
warfighting domain, on par with naturally occurring domains of land, sea, air and space 
(DoD, 2010).  United States Cyber Command was established in 2009 with a mission “to 
defend the information security environment” (United States Strategic Command, 2011, 
Focus, para. 1).  Subsequently, the DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace (DoD, 
2011) was released, and establishes a greater emphasis on IA policy and implementation 
in the DoD.  The strategy declared that threats to information “may be the most pervasive 
cyber threat today” (DoD, 2011, p. 4).  
2. DoD Policy and the Non-malicious Insider Threat 
Threats are any “circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact 
organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or the 
Nation through an information system via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, 
modification of information, and/or denial of service” (CNSS, 2010, p.75).  Human 
threats may exist both on the outside and inside of the DoD defensive perimeter.  In this 
context, an outsider threat is some “entity outside the security domain,” (CNSS, 2010, 
p. 52) while an insider threat is one “with authorized access, i.e., within the security 
domain” (p. 38). 
Insider threats, the focus of this thesis, can be further divided into those with 
malicious or those with non-malicious intentions.  Malicious insiders often exploit their 
access at the “behest of foreign governments, terrorist groups, criminal elements, 
unscrupulous associates, or on their own initiative” (DoD, 2011, p. 3).  Conversely, non-
malicious insiders may threaten information systems without malicious intent toward the 
organization.  Non-malicious insiders are typically well-intentioned employees trying to 
help achieve the goals of the organization, yet who may circumvent IT security controls, 
inadvertently causing harm to the organization.  Non-malicious insiders make up the 
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majority of insider threats within most organizations, including the federal government 
(Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2011; Open Security Foundation, 2011).   
Current DoD policies do little to address non-malicious insider threats.  DoD 
8500.01E declares “internal misuse” as an element that can threaten the IA of DoD 
operations, and indicates that system transactions shall be monitored “to detect, isolate, 
and react to” such threats (DoD, 2007b, p. 7).  DoDI 8500.2 addresses insiders only to the 
extent that insider threats can be an avenue from which an adversary can attack a target.  
Consequently, it states that controls should be established on information systems to 
ensure insiders have the appropriate clearance level and need-to-know for the information 
being accessed (DoD, 2003).  This is the extent to which these top-level policy 
documents address insider threats in the DoD, and no explicit discussion is provided on 
non-malicious insider action, nor are any security controls suggested to address the threat.  
NIST SP 800-30 identifies insiders as a credible threat source that should be accounted 
for in proper risk management, yet it fails to acknowledge these threats could have 
unintentional, or non-malicious motivations (Stoneburner et al., 2002).  
The 2011 DoD cyber strategy improves on these earlier IA policies and 
instructions by placing a greater emphasis on the growing threat of insiders to IA.  It 
states that malicious insider actions could have devastating consequences for the DoD 
and national security, and outlines several mitigation strategies to combat insider threats 
including better communication, personnel training, and new technologies and processes 
(DoD, 2011).  Yet also absent from its pages is any acknowledgement of non-malicious 
insiders and the consequences their actions (DoD, 2011).  
Federally sanctioned studies have been performed to better understand the insider 
threats within organizations.  The U.S. Secret Service and Carnegie Mellon University’s 
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) collaborated on the Insider Threat Study 
(ITS), a multiyear investigation to “identify, assess, and manage potential threats to, and 
vulnerabilities of, data and critical systems” (Computer Emergency Response Team 
[CERT], 2008, para. 1).  ITS detailed extensive findings into the nature of insider threats, 
yet it failed to address the non-malicious aspect of the threat; instead it focused only on 
malicious insiders who “use or exceed their authorized access to information systems to 
 14
perpetrate harm to organizations” (CERT, 2008, para. 2).  Subsequently, the findings of 
the ITS do little to further the understanding of non-malicious insider actions, or of ways 
to mitigate them. 
Lynch (2006) explains an organizational instinct to under-emphasize harmful 
insider actions as an age-old “trusted tribe” (p. 11) mentality, where members of a tribe 
are expected to be trusted and only non-members of the tribe “should be viewed with 
suspicion” (p. 11).  Organizations want to believe that members of their tribe (insiders) 
can always be trusted (Lynch, 2006).  Perhaps, the DoD downplays non-malicious insider 
activity in an effort to deal publicly with outsider enemies (external hackers and 
malicious insiders) but privately with non-malicious insiders.  The ITS seems to support 
this, when it found that “organizations may be reluctant to report on insider activity” 
(U.S. Secret Service & Computer Emergency Response Team/Software Engineering 
Institute [CERT/SEI], 2008, p. 12).  In the absence of top-level DoD policy to address 
insider threats, each organization is left to deal with (or ignore) the threat in a 
decentralized manner.   
3. Threats Posed by the Non-malicious Insider 
The DoD may also intentionally downplay insider involvement in information 
breaches, since it perceives the occurrence of such events, or their resulting impact, as too 
minor to worry about.   However, records show that they pose a real risk.  The Privacy 
Rights Clearinghouse details that insider actions are the cause of a substantial amount of 
data loss, and non-malicious insiders are the primary cause of such loss (Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse, 2011). 
The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse maintains a database of reported data loss since 
2005, currently indexing over 3000 incidences, and more than 500 million records 
breached (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2011).  The database categorizes reported 
incidents by organizational sectors, such as business, government, and nonprofit as well 




disclosure, and file transportation and sharing over portable devices (Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse, 2011).  Figure 2 summarizes the findings of all reported incidences within 
the database.  
       
Figure 2.   Reported data breaches since 2005  
(From Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2011) 
In stark contrast to the findings across all sectors, nearly all breaches within the 
government and military resulted from the misuse of portable devices (85%) and 
unintended disclosure (9%) (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2011).  Non-malicious 
insiders sharing or transporting files of information is a predominant source for both of 
these categories.   Data breaches due to external hackers (2%) and malicious insiders 
(1%) were negligible (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2011). 
The Open Security Foundation’s database of reported data loss since 2003 
describes similar findings, though they do not narrow the results by business sector (Open 
Security Foundation, 2011).  Across all sectors, data loss from external sources was still 
the majority at 55%, but the inside-accidental (non-malicious insider) causes accounted 
for 22%.  Malicious insiders were only half as significant at 10% (Open Security 
Foundation, 2011).  These findings give credence to a statement made by Morris and 
Thompson (1979) that, “good system security involves realistic evaluation of the risks 
not only of deliberate attacks but also of casual authorized access and accidental 
disclosure” (p. 594). 
These findings show data loss with regard to personally identifiable information 
(PII) and do not reflect loss of operational information, such as trade secrets or classified 
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military information.  Leaks of operational information are rarely publicized due to risks 
associated with professional embarrassment, loss of competitive advantage, and in the 
case of the DoD, threats to national security.  
C. HCI-SEC (HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION AND SECURITY) 
Introducing data loss into a system by circumventing security measures leads to 
numerous consequences for non-malicious insiders, including reduced productivity, need 
for personnel retraining, job loss, and mission compromise.  Consequently, there are few 
incentives for non-malicious insiders to willingly risk the consequences of not adhering 
to security policies and procedures.  Two reasons that non-malicious insiders might 
circumvent security measures are: 
 Lack of knowledge of a specific security measure; 
 Difficulty in abiding by a specific security measure. 
This thesis addresses the second reason, i.e., that insiders may threaten IA because 
security measures or mechanisms are too difficult to abide by or use.   The idea that 
usability and security have been treated as opposing goals in software development is 
well established (Balfanz, Durfee, Grinter, & Smetters, 2004; DeWitt & Kuljis, 2006; 
Dourish & Redmiles, 2002; Garfinkel, 2005; Whitten, 2004; Yee, 2002; Zurko & Simon, 
1996).  Systems that focus on being either highly secure, or highly usable, will end up 
becoming neither for their users (Cranor & Garfinkel, 2005).  The term HCI-SEC has 
emerged to define the area of research specifically seeking to align the dual goals of 
security and usability within modern IT systems.   
1. The Problem of Cognitive Friction 
The difficulty of aligning usability and security within IT systems is not 
surprising.  Usability of IT systems in general has been difficult for humans.  Human-
Computer Interaction (HCI) refers to the dialog between a user and a computer needed to 
accomplish a task (Card, Moran, & Newell, 1983), and the field of study seeking to 
improve that dialog.  For more than 30 years, HCI research and development has focused 
on designing better User Interfaces (UI) to translate user intentions into computer actions.  
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Many HCI researchers blame faulty interface designs for the majority of human error 
(Adams & Sasse, 1999; Cooper, 2004; Norman, 2002). 
Cognitive friction is the resistance that the human intellect encounters “when it 
engages with a complex system of rules that change as the problem changes” (Cooper, 
2004, p. 19).  Cooper (2004) states that a major reason computer interfaces remain so 
difficult and error-prone is because human-software interaction is very high in cognitive 
friction.  Norman (1983, 2002) refers to mode error as the difficulty humans encounter 
when complex devices perform different functions based on the mode they are in.  
Human error is induced if a user “believes the system is in one state (mode), when it is 
actually in another” (Norman, 1983, p. 255).   
Cooper (2004) explains that the high cognitive friction found in IT systems is a 
new byproduct of the information age, where computing devices no longer provide one-
to-one mapping of input to output.   Cognitive friction is evident in “all software-based 
products, “regardless of their simplicity” (Cooper, 2004, p. 24).  The complexity of 
computer interfaces, with the resulting cognitive friction, leads to a few principles of 
human behavior that are important to consider in understanding why humans may 
circumvent security controls (knowingly or unknowingly) in the course of interacting 
with a computer UI: 
Users follow a path of least resistance.  Zipf first articulated the principle of least 
effort where humans, in their quest to achieve a goal, will naturally choose the path that 
requires the least amount of effort (Zipf, 1949).  This tendency is documented in a 
number of HCI studies (Cooper, 2004, Krug, 2006: Whitten, 2004; Yee, 2002).  Krug 
(2006) described that it is more efficient to choose “the first reasonable option” (p. 24) 
rather than taking the time and brainpower to find the best one. 
Users are goal-oriented above all.  Human action is goal-oriented, and usability 
problems occur when human goals and the physical devices used to meet those goals do 
not relate well (Norman, 2002; Saltzer & Schroeder, 1975).  Krug (2006) found that 
every interaction with the physical device “adds to our cognitive workload, distracting  
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our attention from the task at hand” (p. 15).  Whitten (2004) observed that security is 
typically a secondary goal for IT users and “if security is too difficult or annoying, users 
may give up on it altogether” (p. 7).  
Users choose trial-and-error rather than reading instructions.  Krug (2006) found 
that most IT users are not particularly interested in “how things work, as long as we can 
use them” (p. 28).  Additionally, when users find one method that works reasonably well 
they “tend not to look for a better way” (Krug, p. 28), which can lead to inefficiencies 
and errors that detract from security. 
2. The Unusability of Security 
Whereas HCI promotes better UIs to help users achieve their goals, HCI-SEC 
seeks to ensure that achieving user’s goals is done in a secure manner.  HCI-SEC argues 
that security is just as important to the aspects of usability as usability is important to the 
aspects of security (Garfinkel, 2005).  
Though highly usable UI designs take great difficulty to achieve, the field of HCI 
has benefitted from a wealth of research.  Unfortunately, this success has not translated to 
the field of HCI-SEC.  “Usability remains one of the most pressing and challenging 
problems for computer security” (p. iii), observed Whitten in 2004, but the claim is still 
true today.  Little progress has been made towards “verifiably usable security” (p. iii) 
despite the widespread understanding of the damaging effects of “configuration errors 
and other user misunderstandings” (Whitten, 2004, p. iii).  Garfinkel (2005) agreed, “the 
topic has only rarely received significant attention as a subject of primary study” (p. 38). 
Saltzer and Schroeder (1975) established some of the earliest foundational work 
for usable security in describing the principle of psychological acceptability.  This 
principle promotes that: 
the human interface be designed for ease of use, so that users routinely and 
automatically apply the protection mechanisms correctly.  Also, to the 
extent that the user’s mental image of his protection goals matches the 
mechanisms he must use, mistakes will be minimized.  If he must translate 
his image of his protection needs into a radically different specification 
language, he will make errors. (Saltzer & Schroeder, 1975, p.1283) 
 19
Sadly, though identified in 1975, the usability of security was neglected for many 
years (Whitten, 2004; Yee, 2002) despite the fact that “many security researchers have 
long considered usability issues, and usability researchers have long considered security 
issues” (Garfinkel, 2005, p. 38).  Few documented works of research in HCI-SEC can be 
found leading into to the 21st Century (Garfinkel, 2005).  This lack of research is 
particularly critical since many existing HCI design principles cannot be applied directly 
to security design elements.  Whitten (2004) emphasized, “many crucial usability 
problems in computer security are fundamentally different from those in most other 
consumer software, and usability design techniques need to be carefully adapted and 
prioritized in order to solve them successfully” (p. 2).  The need for more security 
specific HCI research was necessary. 
Norman (1983) defined classes of human error (slip errors in particular describe 
non-malicious insider behavior) and established design principles to counter them.  
Adams and Sasse (1999) identified the lack of user-center security design as the culprit 
behind why users compromise security mechanisms.  Whitten and Tygar (1999) 
emphasized this point in their study of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) 5.0, highlighting how 
the software’s security features remained unusable after years of UI improvements and 
how these unusable security features led to user error.  
The new decade brought greater security threats as well as more research in HCI-
SEC.  In 2002, Yee’s work advocated for security design from a “user-centered point of 
view” (p. 1) wherein actors (users) and actions (tasks) are the primary focus.  His work 
provided ten ad-hoc principles necessary for secure interaction design (Yee, 2002).  
Whitten (2004) argued that verifiable usable security fails to become a reality because 
security design is “qualitatively different” (p. iii) than that of other types of software, and 
he proposed new UI design methods that specifically address such challenges.  Cranor 
and Garfinkel (2004) edited an Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 
Security and Privacy issue dedicated to security and usability with contributions from 13 
prominent HCI-SEC researchers.  In 2005, Garfinkel argued that usability and security 
can be “synergistically improved” (p. 3) to coexist and presented numerous design 
principles and patterns to better align them.  Later, in 2005, Cranor and Garfinkel edited 
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and published the works of over 50 HCI-SEC researchers under the premise that “today’s 
security problems can be solved only by addressing issues of usability and human 
factors” (Abstract).  This collection of research in the field marked a turning point in the 
limited amount of research for the developing and vital field of HCI-SEC (Cranor & 
Garfinkel, 2005). 
Further evidence of a turning point in research interest in HCI-SEC, the first 
annual Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS) was held in 2005 
(http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/soups).  It has since become a leading research conference 
exclusively promoting scholarly work to improve the usability of privacy and security.  
SOUPS annually presents over a dozen peer-reviewed works of research to further the 
body of knowledge surrounding HCI-SEC. 
D. FILE SHARING RESEARCH 
Tools that enable users to easily and securely share files vary greatly in their 
levels of usability and security.  E-mail is the file sharing tool of choice for most IT users, 
because it is readily available and simple to use (Dalal, Nelson, Smetters, Good, & Elliot, 
2008; Johnson, Bellovin, Reeder, & Schechter, 2009; Voida, Edwards, Newman, Grinter, 
& Ducheneaut, 2006; Whalen, Smetters, & Churchill, 2006); yet e-mail has inherent 
security vulnerabilities that make it a poor choice for sharing sensitive data (Johnson et 
al., 2009; Smetters & Good, 2009).  Other options for sharing files authorized within the 
DoD include use of shared folders, Microsoft SharePoint, and recordable CDs.  
Additionally, Universal Serial Bus (USB) drives, banned within DoD in 2008, were re-
authorized for restricted uses in 2010 (U.S. Strategic Command Public Affairs, 2010). 
Current file sharing solutions do not always address the sharing needs of typical 
users (Dalal et al., 2008; Voida et al., 2006; Whalen et al., 2006).  Whalen et al. (2006) 
observed, “even in a highly technically competent group, with good technical support, 
problems arise regularly, leading to frustration and difficulty” (p. 1520).  As a result, 
users who find it difficult to achieve their work tasks may decide to circumvent 
prescribed sharing systems (Johnson et al., 2009), or the security measures present in the 
prescribed sharing system.  
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Exacerbating this problem is the fact that sharing files requires a user to make 
several critical decisions, each of which can introduce vulnerabilities in the protection 
system. 
1. What Must be Shared? 
The decision of what file to share seems straightforward; however, if done 
incautiously, it can present new security risks.  Users often over-share files, or do not 
delete files that no longer need to be shared (Dalal et al., 2008; Smetters & Good, 2009).  
Good and Krekelberg (2003) found fewer than 10% of participants in their study were 
able to correctly determine which of their files and folders were being shared.  If the 
sharing mechanism does not make users “clearly aware of what files are being offered,” 
(Good & Krekelberg, 2003, p. 139) unauthorized disclosure of personal or professional 
information could result.  
2. With Whom Must a File be Shared?  
Access controls defines whom a file can be shared with, and what permissions the 
recipient has over the file being shared.  Access controls are perhaps the most complex 
aspect of file sharing, thus it receives the majority of research emphasis.  Complex access 
controls, while offering a great deal of restrictive control, come “at the cost of potentially 
high user effort and tendency for error” (Smetters & Good, 2009, p. 1).  Studies of 
audited access control practices found that users set permissions explicitly on only a 
small minority of documents and folder, and instead prefer to rely on the default 
permissions of the system (Smetters & Good, 2009; Whalen et al., 2006).  They also 
found that access permissions were not set once and left alone, but “changes in the work 
environment, as well as the need for short-term sharing, will require people to repeatedly 
interact with access control settings over time” (Whalen et al., 2006, p. 1519).  Good and 
Krekelberg (2003) pointed out that the ability to stop sharing files was equally as 
important as the ability to share files, yet the process of revoking access control is 
difficult in many file sharing solutions.  
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3. What Mechanisms should be Used for Sharing? 
An important decision that a user must make is which mechanism to use for 
sharing files.  Voida et al. (2006), in a study of the affordances presented by a number of 
sharing solutions, found that “selecting a sharing mechanism with the desired features 
that was also available to all sharing recipients” (p. 224) led to a notable breakdown in 
the sharing process.  Though numerous methods are available, each affords different 
limitations in their scope and capabilities.  They found the affordance of scope, i.e., the 
ability to share with the most people, was the predominant motivator for why users chose 
a particular mechanism (Voida et al., 2006).  Further, they found e-mail to be the default 
backup solution for most users as it was the most universally available (Voida et al. 
2006).  
4. The Need for Functionality to Match User Needs 
Beyond the what, whom, and how of file sharing, functional flexibility is an 
equally important element.  Whalen et al. (2006) found that end users have complex 
policy needs that change over time, and were inadequately addressed by current file 
sharing and access control mechanisms.  Current solutions such as e-mail and shared 
folders have been used for years within organizations, yet these have been unable to 
adapt to users changing file sharing needs in the information age.  Human research 
studies indicate that users require a much more flexible solution than current systems 
provide (Dalal et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 2009; Voida et al., 2006).   
Voida et al. (2006) found that users varied substantially in their individual 
affordance needs for file sharing tools, as well as their willingness to share files.  They 
detail several affordance which users require the most and compared various sharing 
mechanisms to determine the extent to which each met users’ needs (Voida et al., 2006).  
Johnson et al. (2009) also understood that current solutions did not meet users 
flexible affordance needs.  Realizing e-mail’s ease-of-use, they sought to better 
understand users sharing needs in an effort to “make Windows shared folders as easy to 
use as it is to attach files to email” (Johnson et al., 2009, p. 1).  They found that systems 
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with restrictive centralized access control hinder “productivity and give individuals less 
incentive to participate in the system,” (p. 1) essentially forcing them to opt for less 
secure alternatives (Johnson et al., 2009).  To better meet the file sharing needs of users, 
they formalized a set of requirements called Laissez-faire sharing, defined by the 
properties of ownership, freedom of delegation, transparency, dependability, and minimal 
friction (Johnson et al., 2009).   
Dalal et al. (2008) similarly found that current file sharing solutions did not 
provide for the complex and transient sharing needs of corporate employees, who 
“regularly bypass secure access procedures by using public web repositories, personal e-
mails, and USB drives to transfer information” (p. 5) all in an insecure manner.  They 
describe a more flexibile form of ad-hoc guesting that limits impedance matching when 
file sharing, supports ad-hoc sharing, eliminates over-sharing, and ensures user 
interaction with the system is simple and self-contained (Dalal et al., 2008).   
E. PERSONAS AND COGNITIVE WALKTHROUGHS 
Based on available solutions for storing, sharing and collaborating on files, this 
thesis shows that popular cloud-based solutions provide more usable security than 
currently approved solutions within the DoD.  It does this by evaluating and comparing 
the usability and security of current solutions, using a method of persona development as 
well as task-based cognitive walkthroughs.  The evaluation criteria used for the 
walkthroughs are based on usability and security principles established in HCI and HCI-
SEC research. 
1. Personas 
Cooper (2004) described a user-centered design method to replace the inadequate 
software design methodologies prevalent in software development.  His Goal-Directed 
design method involved the use of Personas, and has become extremely effective in the 
development of more usable computer interfaces.  Personas are conceptual “people” who 
precisely describe a particular user of a system, and the goals the user wishes to achieve 
through the system (Cooper, 2004).  Although personas are imaginary, they are based on 
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“knowledge of real users” (Calabria, 2004, What are personas?, para. 2) and should be 
defined “with significant rigor and precision” (Cooper, 2004, p. 124).  There are practical 
benefits for designing with personas rather than actual users such as avoiding user’s bias 
towards bad design and requirements creep stemming from user’s wants rather than needs 
(Calabria, 2004; Cooper, 2004).  
To ensure good persona development, personas should be as specific as possible 
to a given task.  One should start with a name, and then build a specific history for the 
persona, detailing such specifics as skills, motivations, and desired goals (Calabria, 2004; 
Cooper, 2004).  Understanding the user’s goals can help in designing a system that aids 
the person in achieving those goals, rather than hindering them.  The objective is to build 
systems that “bend and stretch and adapt to the user’s needs,” rather than the other way 
around (Cooper, 2004).  After personas are developed and their goals are established, 
Cooper’s (2004) method calls for the development of task scenarios, which are a “concise 
description of a persona using a software-based product to achieve a goal” (p. 179).  
Personas are run through chosen tasks to evaluate a system design.  The evaluator, acting 
for the persona, must inhabit the character and perform the task as the persona would.  
The emphasis of a persona and task design on the user’s goals is an important approach, 
since the motivation behind non-malicious insider circumvention of security controls 
often stems from ill-designed security measures that make it difficult for users to achieve 
their goals. 
2. Cognitive Walkthrough 
The cognitive walkthrough concept is a natural complement to the use of 
personas, goals, and task-based scenarios, and is a common evaluation approach used in 
HCI-SEC (Good & Krekelberg, 2003; Whitten & Tygar, 1999).  Based on the early work 
of Wharton, Rieman, Lewis, and Polson (1994), the goal of a cognitive walkthrough is to 
evaluate “a design for ease of learning” (p. 1).  This method of usability testing reflects 
the human tendency towards trial-and-error; in this context, IT users choose not to invest 
time for formal training or reading manuals, but opt instead to learn a system’s 
functionality through exploring the UI (Krug, 2006).   Additionally, ease of learning 
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addresses the goal-oriented nature of humans where users typically choose to learn about 
how to use new features of a system “only when their work actually requires them” 
(Wharton et al., 1994, p. 1).  Finally, evaluating ease of learning accounts for the human 
need to follow a path of least resistance by allowing the costs of discovering a new 
feature to be balanced by the “immediate benefit to the user” (Wharton et al., 1994, p. 1). 
3. Usability and Security Heuristics  
Cognitive walkthroughs are limited by their narrow focus on only one aspect of 
usability: ease of learning.  However, it is important to include other significant aspects 
of usability and security not inherently covered by cognitive walkthroughs.  This thesis 
develops a framework of usability and security heuristics for file sharing, based on 
principles recommended by the HCI and HCI-SEC communities.  This framework is 
introduced in Chapter IV, then used to evaluate current file sharing solutions through 
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III. CURRENT FILE SHARING TECHNOLOGIES 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate leading cloud-based file sharing 
technologies with respect to the usability and security features they provide to the end-
user.  This chapter provides a brief evolution of legacy and current file sharing 
technologies, and introduces emerging cloud-based solutions as having strong potential to 
provide a more optimal solution for the DoD and its users.   
A. BASIC FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
Before we describe the evaluation criteria that will be used to determine which 
technology provides the appropriate balance of usability and security, we define three 
functional requirements of any viable file sharing solution; namely, storage, sharing, and 
collaboration: 
 Storage provides users with a repository for files of information.  Optimal 
storage solutions will provide user-friendly, ubiquitous access to stored 
files that can be synced across a wide range of devices. 
 Sharing provides users the ability to extend file access to other users, and 
to themselves at other locations.  An optimal solution affords the ability to 
share files with a large number of recipients, both within and beyond 
geographic boundaries, as well as versatile access controls that are easy to 
understand and implement.   
 Collaboration provides users the ability to work together with others on 
the same document through mutual accessibility and version control.  
Optimal affordances for collaboration include easy-to-understand 
versioning, the ability to easily audit changes made to a document, as well 
as the ability for multiple contributors to work together on a file in near 
real-time (synchronously).  
We are interested in recommending solutions for further evaluation that provide 
optimal capabilities for file storage, sharing, and collaboration.  This chapter describes a 
number of file sharing solutions that currently are, or could be, used within the DoD.  
Each solution will be evaluated on its ability to provide these three basic functions.  This 
thesis will claim that all three are necessary in an ideal solution, and will suggest a 
solution that optimally provides them.  
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B. THE EVOLUTION OF FILE SHARING TECHNOLOGIES 
Before file sharing emerged within the DoD, all information that users needed 
was stored on local storage drives.  When a user needed to access a file, the computer 
pulled the information from a local drive for processing.  Users in disparate locations 
collaborated by sharing access to local files using cumbersome remote access networks. 
File sharing solutions were developed to enable multiple users to collaborate more easily 
on files of information by transporting them between each other. 
1. Removable Media Solutions 
Removable media describes file storage that can be easily removed from a 
computing device without disrupting the operations of the device.   This method of file 
sharing is informally referred to as “sneakernet,” indicating the need to physically 
transport the data stored on the media.  Floppy disks, developed in the late 1960s, have 
been a dominant removable media for sharing files.  Later technologies such as ZIP 
drives and CD-ROMs complemented the use of floppy disks for sharing files.  USB 
flash-based storage drives, introduced in 2000, have become a popular and ubiquitous 
removable media file sharing method today.  
USB flash-storage drives provide data storage capacities on flash memory, 
integrated into a USB interface.  They have become popular with consumers because of 
their small size and relatively large data storage capacities.  Modern operating systems 
(OS) are pre-installed with drivers that enable them to automatically mount USB drives, 
making them highly portable across devices.   
Sharing files with USB drives is limited by time and geographic distances since 
they rely on sneakernet to physically transport the files.  Additionally, sharing files in this 
manner does not scale well beyond a single recipient.  Finally, collaborating via USB 
drives is limited by its asynchronous editing capabilities with possibly long delay times to 
physically transfer the files between collaborators, and the lack of automatic version 
tracking.  
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The most important limitation of USB drives in the DoD context is the additional 
security threats they pose to enterprise networks through their automated integration with 
OSs.  By default, the Microsoft Windows AutoRun feature allows USB drives to 
automatically execute code embedded on the devices when inserted.  In 2008, a virus was 
exposed to the DoD network that used a USB drive’s portability and Windows’ AutoRun 
automatic mounting feature to quickly spread across the enterprise, eventually crippling 
the DoD network (Lynn, 2010).  In the wake of this incident, the DoD banned the use of 
USB drives for two years.  In 2010, the DoD lifted the ban, but left behind strict 
limitations on the use of USB devices.  Currently, “only government-procured and owned 
devices are allowed” (para.5) and are “limited to mission-essential operations, and only 
after strict compliance requirements are met” (U.S. Strategic Command Public Affairs, 
2010, para. 6).  
While USB drives provide a good means of storage, their limitations for sharing 
and collaborating on files, as well as their increasingly common use for spreading 
malware attacks (Symantec, 2009), make them a suboptimal solution for DoD users. 
2. LAN-Based Solutions 
In the late 1980s, advances in networking allowed organizations to connect 
personal computers with local area networks (LAN).  These networks provided the ability 
to virtually share files across the LAN rather than physically.  Technologies like SANs 
and file servers enabled the centralized storage and management of files across a 
networked domain.  Files and folders stored on SANs can be accessed by any user logged 
onto the network.  Access controls within the OS were used to manage the access that 
individuals had to the files and folders on a SAN.  Windows shared drives, a dominant 
form of network shares on Windows-based enterprises, are a recommended and 
commonly used means of LAN-based file sharing within the DoD today.  
Window’s shared drives provide users a centralized place on the network to store 
a file, or folder of files, that can be accessed by all computers attached to the LAN.  Any 
authenticated network user can have access to files stored on a shared drive.   Highly 
configurable access controls enable both network administrators and end users to set 
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access restrictions on the folders and files residing on the shared drives.  Johnson et al. 
(2009) describe several desirable attributes that Windows shared folders provide for file 
storage, sharing and collaboration.  Shared folders relieve version tracking complications 
by providing collaborators access to only the most recently saved copy of a file (Johnson 
et al., 2009).  They also provide mechanisms that prevent versioning conflicts by 
preventing simultaneous editing (Johnson et al., 2009).  Additionally, they provide space 
efficiency since only a single copy of a document must be stored between all 
collaborators (Johnson et al., 2009).  Finally, shared drives can be a highly secure place 
to store company files if they reside behind a corporate firewall with robust access 
controls.  
Despite these advantages, Johnson et al. (2009) also found that the complex 
access control interfaces provided by Windows shared drives introduce “significant 
friction” (p. 4) for end users.  Reeder and Maxion (2005) confirm these findings and add 
that Windows access controls led to a high level of user permission errors (Reeder & 
Maxion, 2005).  The difficulty of such security measures may drive users to use less 
secure means of file sharing (Johnson et al., 2009; Whitten, 2004).  Additionally, 
collaboration using Windows shared folders is limited to asynchronous editing and lack 
mandatory version tracking.  Finally, sharing and collaboration over LAN-based 
Windows shared folders are typically limited by the logical boundaries of the network on 
which they reside.  These boundaries can be extended using virtual private network 
technology; however, within the DoD, they typically only extend across a military 
installation or a small collection of installations and cannot easily serve a DoD-wide 
solution, let alone collaboration between DoD and non-DoD contributors.  
Microsoft SharePoint is a web-based application introduced in 2001 to fill the 
needs of businesses for content and document management.  SharePoint is most often 
used within the DoD as a local intranet-based portal and enterprise-wide content and 
document manager, but it can also be deployed to support private extranets (web-facing 
extensions of a corporate intranet) and Internet content management; therefore, it can be 
deployed as a viable cloud-based solution.   
 31
While SharePoint was developed to meet numerous enterprise level IT 
requirements, this thesis specifically evaluates its capabilities for file storage, sharing and 
collaboration.  Over the past several years, SharePoint has slowly been deployed across 
the individual DoD enterprises and pushed as the de facto standard for file management.  
Therefore, it is important to fully evaluate the usability and security of SharePoint to 
determine if it is an appropriate solution for the DoD.  
3. Internet-based Solutions 
We refer to Internet-based solutions as those that provide sharing functionality 
over the connectivity of the Internet, where IT products and services that provide sharing 
are either decentralized across the Internet, or centralized within an organization’s LAN.  
A few of the most popular Internet-based solutions include file transfer protocol (FTP), 
peer-to-peer networks, and e-mail.  FTP provides users with simple functionality to 
download files from, or upload files to, a centralized location (e.g., file server), however 
it has not been widely used within DoD networks.  Peer-to-peer networks allow the 
sharing of files and peripherals across the Internet via direct communication between 
connected computers rather than through a central server.  Such networks are often 
maliciously abused for transferring illegal content and malicious code; therefore, they are 
generally not authorized on DoD networks.   
E-mail is the most popular means of sharing files across the Internet (Dalal et al., 
2008; Johnson et al., 2009; Voida et al., 2006; Whalen et al., 2006), and is widely used 
within the DoD.  Since e-mail messages with attached files can be both sent and archived, 
e-mail is a popular means of file sharing, collaborating, and long-term storage.   Not 
limited by the logical or geographical boundaries of a LAN, e-mail provides a highly 
reliable and distributed platform, and it removes the cognitive friction of complex access 
controls that might otherwise discourage its use.  
Despite its usability, e-mail has significant drawbacks.  E-mail servers and clients 
often limit the size of attached files, precluding sharing of large files (Dalal et al., 2008).  
Like USB drives and Windows shared folders, collaboration through e-mail is limited to 
asymmetric editing.   Versioning in e-mail is possible through good management of an e-
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mail chain, but the effort is not automated and can be overly cumbersome if inboxes are 
not properly organized.  E-mail is also not an ideal solution for storage since files remain 
attached to disparate e-mails that may be difficult to organize and sort.  Additionally, 
storing files in e-mail leads to file duplication since many e-mail servers store separate 
copies of the same file for each recipient (Dalal et al., 2008).   
An important security limitation is that e-mail does not provide the ability to 
revoke access to a file once granted (Smetters & Good, 2009).  Files attached to e-mails 
cannot be reliably recalled once a message is sent, and further access to the file cannot be 
denied without the use of a digital rights management system.  Additionally, the ease of 
use of e-mail often leads to the inadvertent disclosure of information to unintended 
recipients.  Such limitations in its storage and collaboration capabilities, as well as its 
inherent security deficiencies, preclude e-mail from being an ideal file sharing solution 
on DoD networks, despite its widespread use.  
4. Cloud-based Solutions 
Cloud computing, as defined by Mell & Grance (2011), provides “ubiquitous, 
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computer 
resources” (p. 2) including networks, servers, storage, applications and services.  Due to 
the “wide range of benefits” (p. 7) cloud technologies provide, U.S. government 
leadership has implemented a “Cloud First” (p. 7) policy for federal government IT 
management, including “using commercial cloud technologies where feasible” (Kundra, 
2010, p. 7). Additionally, the National Security Telecommunications Advisory 
Committee (NSTAC), in its 2012 advisory report to the President of the United States, 
listed the capabilities found in current cloud-based file sharing technologies (e.g., 
Document Collaboration, Project Coordination, and Data Archiving and Storage) as 
“mission functions which appear most attractive for cloud migration” and “should be 
considered for earliest programmatic action” (p. 45).   
Subsequently, the DoD published its own Cloud Computing Strategy indicating 
that it will “leverage commercially offered cloud services that offer the same or a greater 
level of protection necessary for DoD mission and information assets” (2012).  For the 
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DoD, and all federal agencies, to leverage the availability of commercial Cloud Service 
Providers (CSP) while maintaining the strict security measures required within the 
federal government, the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program 
(FedRAMP) was established in June of 2012 as the result of close collaboration between 
numerous federal agencies and private industry (http://www.fedramp.gov).  FedRAMP 
provides a “standardized approach to security assessment, authorization, and continuous 
monitoring for cloud-based service” (FedRAMP, 2012, p. 2).         
This move towards cloud-based technologies is due to the organizational benefits 
they enable, including IT systems that are efficient, agile, and innovative (DoD, 2012b).  
Cloud-based file sharing technologies utilize a shared pool of storage resources, remotely 
connected through the Internet, to provide users a highly scalable and globally accessible 
solution for file storage, sharing, and collaboration.  These solutions combine, and 
improve upon, the functional benefits of legacy solutions.   
Cloud-based solutions improve upon the boundary limitations of LAN-based 
solutions in several ways.  First, the connectivity of the Internet allows users to access 
their files from anywhere in the world with an Internet connection.  Files are no longer 
tied to the logical boundaries of the LAN.  Further, accessibility is expanded to any 
device with a web browser (desktop or mobile) regardless of the OS.  Finally, many 
cloud-based services automatically synchronize files between remote data stores and 
local hard drives to ensure availability during network outages.  
Cloud-based solutions provide the same file sharing ease-of-use as e-mail, while 
improving upon its access control limitations.  Cloud-based solutions typically provide 
access controls that allow a sender to restrict a recipient’s use of stored information, as 
well as the ability to revoke access when needed.  Additionally, because a link to the file 
can be shared in cloud-based solutions, rather than the file itself, server storage 
limitations and security concerns associated with passing files through e-mail are 
mitigated (Nelson, Dinolt, Michael, & Shing, 2011). 
Cloud-based solutions improve upon previous collaboration methods in a number 
of ways.  First, cloud-based solutions not only synchronize changes made to a document 
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by multiple users, but also provide automatic version control for these changes.  This 
reduces human error associated with manual ad hoc versioning, and increases the 
likelihood that previous versions can be found.  Additionally, some cloud-based services 
allow end users to audit the access controls in place on a file.  User-accessible auditing 
allows users to determine what files they are sharing, and with whom, as well as who has 
accessed and modified their files.  These capabilities are not possible with USB drives or 
e-mail, and only available to system administrators in Windows shared drive 
deployments.  Services may also provide synchronous and/or asynchronous methods of 
collaboration, enhancing real-time productivity. 
Finally, cloud-based file sharing solutions provide automatic off-site storage.  For 
federal agencies, including the DoD, such off-site storage is a NIST standard in 
accordance with Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) requirements 
to ensure the availability and redundancy of information (Swanson, 2010).  As an 
additional benefit, cloud-based technologies transport the information typically with 
strong encryption, making it far more secure than an employee’s automobile (Kime, 
2011).   
C. POSSIBLE CLOUD-BASED FILE SHARING SOLUTIONS  
Numerous cloud-based file sharing solutions exist that provide functional 
improvements over DoD’s current methods for file storage, sharing, and collaboration.  
Table 1 enumerates multiple cloud-based file sharing technologies and show whether 
each service provides the three functional requirements described in this chapter for 
effective file storage, sharing, and collaboration.   The ability to locally synchronize files 
has been added as an additional requirement, since this capability is important for DoD 
users to maintain access to files in the midst of limited network connectivity.  Alexa, a 
leading provider of global web analytics, provides traffic ranks based on a combination of 
daily visitors to a site and page views over the last three months.  Alexa traffic rankings 
indicate the relative global popularity of an Internet service (http://www.alexa.com), and 












Sync  Sharing  Collaboration Asynchronous  Synchronous
Dropbox   168   X  X  X  X    
Box   730   X  X  X  X 
Zoho   1,042   X    X   X  X    
Sugarsync   6,006   X  X  X   X    
Acronis   11,456   X  X          
Carbonite   12,300   X  X          
Mozy   20,081   X  X          
Wuala   20,802   X  X  X  X    
Egnyte   24,603   X  X  X  X    
Jungle Disk   79,209   X  X  X  X    
Cubby  83,828  X  X  X  X   
SpiderOak  147,728  X  X  X  X   
ElephantDrive   289,371   X  X  X  X    
Google Drive   N/A   X  X  X  X  X 
SkyDrive   N/A   X  X  X  X  X 
Table 1.   Basic functionality comparison of popular cloud-based technologies 
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IV. EVALUATION METHODS 
As stated previously, the ultimate purpose of this thesis is to develop an 
evaluation methodology for assessing the usability and security affordances of cloud-
based file sharing technologies for the end-user.  This chapter presents the methodology, 
which builds off the combination of a heuristics evaluation and cognitive walkthrough.  
Chapter V will subsequently demonstrate the methodology using a few popular 
technologies.  
The cognitive walkthrough method is commonly used to evaluate the usability 
and security of computer interfaces.  Because cognitive walkthroughs are focused 
primarily on “one attribute of usability, ease of learning” (Wharton et al., 1994, p. 3), we 
incorporate an additional heuristic evaluation method (Nielsen, 2005a) in our evaluation 
of the four cloud-based file sharing solutions chosen in Chapter IV.  Whitten and Tygar 
(1999) used a similar approach, combining both a cognitive walkthrough and heuristic 
evaluation in their analysis if PGP 5.0.  In this chapter, a heuristic evaluation will 
determine if each solution provides the necessary usability and security functionality, and 
the cognitive walkthrough will determine how usable that functionality is for three 
different user personas. 
A. HEURISTIC EVALUATION 
 A heuristics evaluation involves assessing the user interface “against a specific 
list of high-priority usability principles” (Whitten & Tygar, 1999, p. 6).  This section 
describes the high-priority principles used for this evaluation, which incorporate security 
as well as usability recommendations of numerous researchers from the HCI and HCI-
SEC communities.  These heuristics are summarized in Table 2.  While not all inclusive, 
these principles represent the ones most germane to cloud-based file sharing.  From each 
heuristic, questions are derived (Table 3) to evaluate whether the file sharing technology 




1  Access Control  Employ  simple,  seamless,  mandatory  access  controls  based  on 
universal identifiers  
2  Appearance  Present a familiar and minimal appearance that  is consistent with 
platform conventions 
3  Cognitive Friction  Reduce  cognitive  friction  by  removing  sharing  inhibitors  and 
providing shortcuts and the ability to group collaborators 
4  Error Reduction  Interfaces should employ the principle of  least privilege, effective 
warning  messages,  and  clearly  marked  exits  to  reduce  human 
error 
5  Security Feedback  Increase  user  awareness  through  security  related  feedback  and 
auditing 
6  Data Ownership  Provide  a  strong  sense  of  ownership  through  delegation  and 
revocability 
7  Automatic Versioning  Provide  mechanisms  for  automatic  versioning  and  conflict 
resolution 
8  Reference Links  Utilize the benefits of e‐mail through reference links 
9  Ubiquitous Access  Access  to  files  should  be  available  online,  offline,  and  across 
popular operating systems and devices 
10  Security Compliance  Comply with industry standards for secure storage and handling 
Table 2.   Cloud-based file sharing usability and security heuristics 
1. Access Control: Employ Simple, Seamless, Mandatory Access Control 
Based on Universal Identities 
Perhaps the most important security concern for storing and sharing files in the 
cloud is ensuring users can reliably apply access control restrictions on files.  Whitten & 
Tygar (1999) emphasize that security software must ensure users “are reliably made 
aware of the security tasks they need to perform,” and “are able to figure out how to 
successfully perform those tasks” (p. 3).  Security in cloud-based file sharing systems 
must guide users toward successfully employing appropriate access controls on their 
files.   
To appropriately employ access controls, user identities must be established.  
These identities should be derived from universal identifiers like e-mail addresses to 
ensure the widest scope of sharing (Dalal et al., 2008; Garfinkel, 2005) but also must be 
tied to a method of strong identity authentication like Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
(Nelson et al., 2011).  All actions should be attributed to these identities so all actions can 
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be traced back to the user responsible for the action.  For usability, identities should be 
capable of single-sign-on (SSO) with corporate authentication to reduce the need for 
additional password complexities.  
Discretionary access controls (DAC) enable the owner, typically, of an object data 
file the authority to delegate or restrict access to that object (CNSS, 2010).  File sharing 
solutions must provide mechanisms to enforce discretionary access controls (Nelson et 
al., 2011).  Whalen et al. (2006) recommend access controls be simple: “flexible enough 
to accomplish common user tasks,” but not so granular that they are “confusingly 
complex” (p. 1522). They also recommend that changes be easy to perform and not 
buried under too many levels of menus (Whalen et al., 2006).   Smetters and Good (2009) 
recommended limiting the types of permissions available, indicating they found little 
value in permissions beyond simple “read and write and perhaps execute” (p. 11).  
Finally, Whalen et al. (2006) recommended these security tasks should “fit seamlessly 
into [the] task at hand,” (p. 1522) so applying such controls should seem like a natural 
part of the user workflow.  
2. Appearance: Present a Familiar, Consistent, Minimal Appearance 
Whitten and Tygar (1999) propose that usability of security software is enhanced 
when users “are sufficiently comfortable with the interface to continue using it” (p. 3).   
Usability requires a familiar appearance that follows consistent conventions in a 
minimalist appearance.  For familiarity, the cloud-based file storage interface should be 
presented to the user as a typical file system (Nelson et al., 2011), with dialog that is 
expressed clearly “with words, phrases, and concepts familiar to the user” (Nielsen, 
2005b, para. 3) rather than system jargon.  For consistency, terms and controls used 
across the application should conform to platform conventions and their placement 
should be consistent across the application (Garfinkel, 2005; Nielsen, 2005b).  Such 
consistency helps to reduce the memory effort required of users (Norman, 1983).  Effort 
can be further reduced “by making objects, actions, and operations visible” (Nielsen, 
2005b, para. 7) to the user and ensuring helpful instructions are visible and easily 
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retrievable when needed.  Finally, systems should have a minimal design that removes 
irrelevant or rarely used information (Nielsen, 2005b).  
3. Cognitive Friction: Reduce Cognitive Friction by Removing Sharing 
Inhibitors and Providing Shortcuts and the Ability to Group 
Collaborators 
To counter users’ tendency toward the path of least resistance, Yee (2002) 
recommended, “the most natural way to do any task should also be the most secure way” 
(p. 3).  File sharing systems must remain secure while reducing the barriers that “inhibit 
sharing” (Johnson et al., 2009, p. 2).   Cognitive friction remains a barrier in any IT 
system, and must be reduced to a minimum in a secure file sharing system if people are to 
use it over unsecured means like e-mail.   
In order to reduce cognitive friction in file sharing, Dalal et al. (2008) urge 
development of systems that support all types and sizes of files, and only require a 
minimal set of tools to use the system (e.g., e-mail and a web browser).  Additionally, 
shortcuts should be provided for experienced users to use for frequent tasks so that 
experienced and novice users alike are productive and satisfied (Molich & Nielsen, 
1990).  Finally, it is important to allow users to specify logical groups of individuals 
“with whom files should be shared” (Voida et al., 2006, p. 226).  Smetters and Good 
(2009) suggest tools that “maximize the use of groups” (p. 10) to handle access controls 
more effectively.  
4. Error Reduction: Interfaces should Employ the Principle of Least 
Privilege, Effective Warning Messages, and Clearly Marked Exits to 
Reduce Human Error 
Norman (1983) claims that people will make errors so systems should be designed 
to be insensitive to the errors.  Usable security should minimize the user’s ability to make 
dangerous errors (Whitten & Tygar, 1999), including unintentionally sharing private files 
with others (Good & Krekelberg, 2003), and unintentionally deleting files permanently.   
To reduce unintentional sharing, Saltzer and Schroeder’s (1975) principle of least 
privilege should be followed whereby “every user of a system should operate using the 
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least set of privileges necessary to complete the job” (p. 1282), and “the default situation 
is lack of access” (Saltzer & Schroeder, 1975, p. 1282).  For file sharing, only explicit 
positive grants of access should be allowed (Smetters & Good, 2009; Yee, 2002).  This 
principle follows the requirement of Dalal et al. for “no oversharing” (2008, p. 5).  
Nielsen (2005b) recommended error-reducing systems would “either eliminate 
error-prone conditions or check for them and present users with a confirmation option 
before they commit to the action” (Nielsen, 2005b, para. 6).  Effective warning messages 
are expressed in plain language, precisely indicate the exact cause of problem, and 
recommend meaningful solutions for the user (Molich & Nielsen, 1990).  They should 
warn users of the effects of an action before it has taken place (Yee, 2002).  
Additionally, to ensure systems are insensitive to errors, actions should be 
reversible as much as possible (Norman, 1983).  As human mistakes are unavoidable, 
systems should provide users “clearly marked exits” (Molich & Nielsen, 1990, p. 339) to 
easily leave an unwanted state.  Undo and redo features should be provided (Nielsen, 
2005b).  Unrecoverable actions should be more difficult to perform than recoverable 
ones, either through warning messages or delayed execution that gives users a chance “to 
change their minds” (Garfinkel, 2005, p. 320). 
5. Security Feedback: Increase User Awareness through Security 
Related Feedback and Auditing 
Whalen et al. (2006) found that “setting access permissions can be difficult and 
error-prone” (p. 1522) and users require an easy way to see “what has been done”  
(p. 1522).  Likewise, users often forgot “what files had been shared and with whom” 
(Voida et al., 2006, p. 223).  Therefore, providing tools that make users clearly aware of 
what files are being offered is in important heuristic (Good & Krekelberg, 2003).  Usably 
secure systems “should always keep users informed about what is going on, through 
appropriate feedback within reasonable time” (Nielsen, 2005b, para. 2). Others describe 
security related feedback as visibility (Norman, 1983; Yee, 2002), transparency (Johnson 
et al., 2009), and explicit user auditing (Garfinkel, 2005).   These terms refer to the ability 
of data owners to quickly and easily discover what files they have stored in the system, 
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who they have shared them with (Garfinkel, 2005), what access controls have been 
delegated on the files, and who has made changes to them (Johnson et al., 2009).  Such 
tools decrease errors, and increase user effectiveness (Smetters & Good, 2009).  
To further improve usability through feedback, Voida et al. (2006) recommended 
that notifications be made available and visible to avoid the usability breakdowns they 
found in the lack of collaborators knowing “when new content was made available (or 
updated)” (p. 224).  Notification should also be made available to allow data owners to 
answer access requests for files (Bauer, Cranor, Reeder, Reiter, & Vaniea, 2008).  
6. Data Ownership: Provide a Strong Sense of Ownership through 
Delegation and Revocability 
Johnson et al. (2009) describe file ownership as a core principle to “better address 
the file sharing needs of information workers” (p. 1).  Individuals who first introduce a 
document into a sharing system should “not have to sacrifice rights” (Johnson et al., 
2009, p. 2) of ownership to use the system.  Sharing systems should also promote 
freedom of delegation by ensuring an owner maintains the right to delegate any or all 
access rights to a document, “including the right for further delegation or even full 
ownership” to others (Johnson et al., 2009, p. 2).   
An additional right of ownership is the ability to revoke access to a file from 
others.  Good and Krekelberg (2003) defined the ability of a user to “stop sharing files 
successfully” (p. 139) as an important usability feature of file distribution systems.   Yee 
(2002) also lists revocability as a requirement for usably secure systems “wherever 
revocation is possible” (p. 3). 
7. Automatic Versioning: Provide Mechanisms for Automatic 
Versioning and Conflict Resolution 
Nelson et al. (2011) suggested that a mechanism for referencing versions of 
documents should be employed in any DoD cloud-based file storage solution to ensure 
that an inheritable security definition is maintained.   Additionally, Whalen et al. (2006) 
recommend versioning to “improve methods for socially appropriate content protection” 
 43
(p. 1522).  Further, automatic versioning should be used to increase group productivity by 
reducing the complexity and time required by collaborators to develop manual ad-hoc 
methods of version control, as well as increasing the likelihood that a version of a file is 
readily available when needed.   
Equally important in a system that provides automatic versioning is a robust 
“mechanism to merge divergent histories together” to reduce data loss and confusion 
when “two inconsistent copies of a file” are found (Nelson et al., 2011, p. 163).  
8. Reference Links: Utilize the Benefits of E-mail through Reference 
Links 
To supplant users’ tendency to use e-mail as a sharing medium, “any cloud 
service for data sharing should be at least as easy as e-mailing files” (Nelson et al., 2011, 
p. 163).  In order to combine the usability of e-mail with the security of access control 
restrictions, Nelson et al. (2011) propose the use of sharing files through e-mail via 
reference links to the file stored in the cloud instead of attaching a copy of the actual file.  
Such referencing ensures “email is no longer a target for intercepting sensitive files” 
(Nelson et al., 2011, p. 163).  Referencing also eliminates the need for e-mail attachment 
size limits and e-mail servers being overloaded with duplicate files.  E-mail then becomes 
a familiar tool for users to pass files, but security and usability of storing the files is still 
maintained by the cloud-based service.  Further, referencing a file through e-mail ensures 
the cloud system’s sharing scope is as wide as e-mail, an important affordance for users 
(Voida et al., 2006).   
9.  Ubiquitous Access: Access to Files should be Available Online, 
Offline, and Across Popular Operating Systems and Devices 
Growing in popularity in recent years, mobile devices (e.g., tablets and 
smartphones) have found their way into highly collaborative organizations, and IT 
departments have shifted toward a “bring your own device” (BYOD) strategy.  BYOD 
has both productivity and usability benefits, but also poses significant security concerns 
for an organization (Bradley, 2011).  To answer such trends, the DoD has released its 
own mobile device strategy, citing benefits to “improve information sharing, 
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collaboration” and “advance the operational effectiveness of the DoD workforce” (Takai, 
2012, para. 2).  Including mobile devices in IT infrastructure allows information access 
and collaboration to extend beyond the geographical boundaries of a desktop.   
Ubiquitous access includes the ability to access files on virtually any computing 
device regardless of the operating system.  Mechanisms should be provided to 
automatically sync remote and local files to ensure availability when a connection to the 
Internet is interrupted. Files should be accessible on dominant desktop and mobile 
operating systems, including Windows and Macintosh on the desktop and Android and 
iOS on mobile devices (Net Applications, 2012a; Net Applications, 2012b). BlackBerry 
OS maintains a strong presence within business organizations and the federal government 
and should be considered for these sectors.  
10. Security Compliance: Comply with Industry Standards for Secure 
Storage and Handling 
Voida et al. (2006) listed the “location of files during [sharing]” (p. 125) as a 
consideration for users when choosing a file sharing solution.  For the DoD, it is 
important to consider where files are being stored, as well as how securely the 
transmission and storage of the files in the cloud are managed.  
Current industry standards for secure file transfer and handling call for data in 
transit and at rest at the data centers to be protected with strong encryption.  An 
additional recommendation is for the ability to maintain sole ownership of the keys used 
to encrypt the information, coined “pre-Internet encryption” by Gibson (2011).  Further, 
third-party certifications (e.g., SSAE 16 Type II, FISMA, ISO 27001, FIPS 140-2, and 
ISO 270001) indicate a cloud-based service’s compliance with industry standard security 
controls, management and operations.  As described in Chapter III, a FedRAMP security 
authorization indicates a CPSs compliance with federal security requirements and should 
be considered for any federal organization using this thesis’ methods (FedRAMP, 2012).  
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11. Heuristic Implementation Questions 
The following questions will be used to assess whether the cloud-based file 
sharing solutions implement the usability and security principles of each heuristic: 	
 





































































Table 3.   Questions to assess whether cloud-based file sharing technologies 
implement the principles of the heuristics 
B. EVALUATION PERSONAS 
To conduct a cognitive walkthrough, we will employ the use of personas as 
described by Cooper (2004) and summarized in section 2.5.1 of this thesis. As suggested 
by Calabria (2005) we have developed a discrete set of personas to “satisfy all users with 
similar goals” (p. 4).  Although all DoD users cannot be represented, the three personas 
listed in Table 3 contrast the most common levels of technical expertise, professional 
experience, and duty related goals found in the DoD in an effort to appeal to the broadest 
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range of users.   We will describe each persona in an effort to understand who they are, 
what level of IT skills they have, and the motivations and goals that drive their 






Table 4.   Personas used to assess the usability and security of cloud-based file sharing 
technologies 
1. Chris, the Tech-Savvy Young Airman 
 
Figure 3.   Chris, the tech-savvy young airman 
Chris is a 20-year-old junior enlisted airman serving in his first duty station at an 
overseas air base.  He joined the service almost two years ago after working part time at a 
big box electronics store for a year after high school.  He learned about computers in 
middle school and built his own during a basic computer course as a sophomore in high 
school.  He enjoys music, video games and socializing on the web with friends back 
home through social media sites.  Technology is his hobby and he is thrilled at the chance 
to try out new IT products and services, especially when they are highly configurable to 
fit his needs.   
Chris currently works as a network operations apprentice, responsible for the 
maintenance and uninterrupted operations of all servers providing basic communication  
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services (e.g., e-mail, file servers, Internet access) to over 6,000 base personnel.  He 
received 15 weeks of technical training for this job, but many of his skills were developed 
outside of formal training programs.  
Though excited about the prospects of this job, he is quickly disappointed to find 
most of his actual tasks are mundane and effortless to him.  Much of his day is spent 
resetting BlackBerry and Active Directory accounts, finding files on the SAN that users 
accidentally deleted or lost, and fixing permissions for folders on the file server.  He gets 
tired of people complaining about lost files, or the limited e-mail space they are given.   
Chris is always looking for ways to make his job more interesting, which typically 
involves quickly solving customers’ problems so he can get back to browsing the web for 
new and interesting technology.  But he also knows that if he can impress his boss, he has 
a chance of getting the coveted Airman-of-the-Quarter award and impressing his friends 
and family.  Accordingly, he is always looking for better productivity solutions to please 
his boss and get off the phone with customers faster.  
He is excited to hear about a new file sharing system to replace shared drive for 
storing and sharing files across the base.  The idea that users can now handle many of 
their problems personally may reduce many of his monotonous tasks.  Though he 
personally does not have to share files very often with co-workers, he has not been able 
to use his thumb drive due to official directives and is looking for an official way of 





2. Bob, the Seasoned Non-commissioned Officer In Charge (NCOIC) 
 
Figure 4.   Bob, the seasoned NCOIC 
Bob, a 39-year-old senior enlisted airman, has been in the military for 18 years.   
He came into the Air Force as a mechanic, but has been a network infrastructure operator 
for the last 14 years.  This experience has made him somewhat of a subject matter expert 
(SME) in his field.  
Bob has served the last 3 years as the NCOIC of the network infrastructure shop, 
but recently stepped up to be the section superintendent.  His supervisory responsibilities 
have expanded beyond his shop to include network operations (where Chris works) and 
network security.  He thoroughly enjoyed his hands-on responsibilities as the lead SME 
of his shop, so the transition to the management work of a superintendent has been slow.  
Now supervising the operations of 54 airmen across the three shops, most of his daily 
duties include attending meetings, answering taskers from his boss, quality checking the 
work done by the shops, and writing appraisals and awards for his airmen.  These tasks 
present him with over 90 e-mails each day, 70% of which require a response.  His inbox 
remains only moderately organized with important e-mails and files spread across half-
hearted attempts to get organized.  He gets aggravated knowing he probably spends 
nearly an hour each day just looking for lost messages and files in his inbox.  He misses 
working face-to-face with the troops and schedules opportunities to get out of the office 
and visit them—even if that means skipping a lunch or two or missing a couple deadlines.  
With over 14 years working with network interfaces and programming Internet 
protocol address ranges, his computer hardware skills are excellent.  However, he feels 
only moderately proficient with software like the Microsoft Office suite.  It can take Bob 
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many months to become comfortable with a new software interface, and each time he 
does, the Air Force seems to push down a new system to replace the one he just learned.  
DoD budget cuts have forced personnel reductions, so new automated systems are 
constantly deployed to help the remaining work force do more with less. But each new 
system requires him to learn an entirely new way of doing things.  He would prefer to 
continue using the systems he is comfortable with.    
Bob wants to look professional and be in control.  As an SME for the section, he 
is looked to as an example for knowledge, skill, and situational awareness.  Such 
awareness of the operations of three large shops means constantly being tapped into 
information.  He does not want to appear stressed or frantic about the numerous deadlines 
he has to meet, even though he is.  Additionally, he is hoping that having better control of 
the flight affairs will impress his boss and hopefully put him in line for a quarterly award 
that will gain him a few more points toward a promotion next year.  He is intrigued by a 
new system coming that aspires to facilitate more efficient file storage, sharing and 
collaboration.  While he sees it as an opportunity to be more productive, he is mostly 
anxious about the learning curve it will take to master the system.   
3. Alice, the Inexperienced Commander’s Secretary 
 
Figure 5.   Alice, the inexperienced commander’s secretary 
Alice recently found a day job as the secretary for the communications squadron 
commanders (where Bob and Chris work).  As a 45-year-old mother of three, she is in her 
first professional job in several years, returning to work now that her youngest is in 
school.  Her husband serves in the military so she has a lot of experience living with, but 
not working for, the military.  She has never been a secretary before, so she was very 
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surprised to be hired.  She is a fast typist, but aside from casual web surfing, she has very 
little experience with computers.  She attributes her hiring to her very friendly and 
enjoyable personality.  Now she has become overwhelmed with the workload required by 
her job.  She has taken a basic online course to learn Microsoft Office, but feels she is in 
over her head for most of the IT related secretarial skills she has been asked to perform.  
Recognizing Alice’s inability to keep up with her duties, the commander brought 
in a temporary assistant to help.  Now, Alice wants nothing more than to show 
confidence in her duties to build her boss’s trust so that he no longer feels she needs help.   
Alice learns quickly, but gets frustrated when what she thinks should be a simple task 
becomes overly complicated by computers.  Ultimately, she just wants to unbury herself 
from the piles of work that are growing around her.   
Most of Alice’s day is filled with managing the commander’s e-mail inboxes and 
schedules and answering phone calls.  She is becoming more proficient at skimming e-
mail and managing his calendar, but answering the phone causes here great anxiety.  
Most calls are questions she rarely has the answer to.  They involve questions regarding 
base rules and regulations, upcoming events, and overall situational awareness of things 
at the commander’s level.  Answers to these questions require access to information that 
she knows is available on the squadron’s shared drive, but she has had very little success 
finding the information she needs.  Further, she is concerned with how to efficiently share 
the information with the person requesting when she does find it.  Finally, she finds it 
very difficult to organize her files so she can find the information again when needed.  As 
the commander’s secretary, she is required to post and share numerous command level 
documents onto the shared drives folders for others to use.  Sometimes the information 
she has is sensitive and she must find a secure means of sharing the information with only 
specific people.   
C. EVALUATION TASKS  
The tasks listed in Table 5 have been developed to evaluate the usability of each 
cloud-based technology’s implementation of the usable security heuristics in section 4.1.  
Task-based scenarios are a “concise description of a persona using a software-based 
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product to achieve a goal” (Cooper, 2004, p. 179), and are used here to describe the tasks 
and “actions sequences for completing the tasks” (Wharton et al., 1994, p. 2) required as 
inputs for a cognitive walkthrough.  Following recommendations from Cooper (2004) 
and Wharton et al. (1994), we limit the number of tasks to those most relevant to DoD 
users sharing files securely.  
 
#  Task  Evaluates 
1  Add a file to the service  Familiarity  with  the  interface  appearance  and 
functionality and overall usability 
2  Organize a given folder structure  Familiarity  with  the  interface  appearance  and 
functionality and overall usability 
3  Share  a  file  with  co‐works  with 
specific rights 
How  easily  one  can  share  files  and  apply 
appropriate access controls to access them 
4  Determine  which  files  and  folders 
are being shared 
The  availability,  visibility,  and  usability  of  the 
feedback and auditing tools provided by the service 
5  Audit collaborators actions on a file  The  availability,  visibility,  and  usability  of  auditing 
tools  to  determine  who  has  accessed  or  made 
changes to a file 




7  Determine  the  access  controls on  a 
shared file 





9  Fix inconsistent versions of a file  The  availability,  visibility,  and  usability  of  tools  to 
de‐conflict inconsistent versions of a file 
10  Find  a  specific  file  within  a  large 
hierarchy of files 
The  file  retrieval  usability  and  capabilities  of  the 
service 
Table 5.   Cognitive walkthrough tasks to assess the usability and security of cloud-
based file sharing technologies 
1. Add a File to the Service 
This task requires the persona to take a file from the desktop and place it on the 
sharing service using the tools provided by the particular sharing service, and is intended 
to evaluate familiarity with the appearance, functionality and overall usability.   
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2. Organize a Given Folder Structure 
This task presents the user with the web interface of each service, preloaded with 
five files, and requires the persona to organize the files to match a folder hierarchy 
presented to the persona.  This also evaluates the persona’s familiarity with the interface 
and their ability to use the tools provided.   
3. Share a File with Co-workers with Specific Rights 
In this task, a persona must share a given folder with two coworkers, and delegate 
to each coworker a different permission level.  This will evaluate how easily each 
solution allows the persona not only to share a file with others within the organization, 
but also to ensure the appropriate access controls are in place on the file once shared.  
4. Determine which Files and Folders are Being Shared 
This task requires the persona, presented with an intricate folder hierarchy 
containing over 3,000 files, to use the service’s feedback tools to determine which of the 
thousands of files are being shared with others.  This evaluates the availability, visibility, 
and usability of the feedback and auditing tools provided by the service.   
5. Audit Collaborators’ Actions on a File  
Here, a persona is presented with a file that several collaborators have made 
changes to, and must determine who made the changes.  This task evaluates the 
availability, visibility, and usability of auditing tools to determine who has accessed or 
modified a file.  
6. Revoke a Collaborator’s Access to a File or Folder 
When a collaborator is no longer part of the team working on a particular file, 




the name of a collaborator who no longer needs access to it, and asks the persona to 
remove access.  This task evaluates the availability, visibility, and usability of tools that 
allow revoking access to a shared file. 
7. Determine the Access Controls on a Shared Folder 
Given a particular file with numerous collaborators having access to it, this task 
requires the persona to determine who has access to the file and what access modes they 
have, using the tools provided by the service.  This evaluates the availability, visibility, 
usability of the feedback and auditing tools provided by the service.   
8. Revert to an Earlier Version of a File 
This task provides the persona with a file that has gone through several revisions.  
Determined that the last three changes made to a file are not to be used, this task asks 
users to revert to the version saved before the last three revisions.  This task evaluates the 
availability, visibility, and usability of the automatic versioning mechanisms of each 
service, and how easily one can access the versions as well as revert to an older file.  The 
only help provided to the user is the file, with no indication on how to access the versions 
or how to revert to older ones.   
9. Fix Inconsistent Versions of a File  
Inconsistencies arise when two collaborators work on and save changes to a file at 
the same time, creating conflicts between the versions.  This task requires a persona to 
resolve the conflicts between the two versions using the tools provided by the service.  In 
addition to evaluating the tool’s ease-of-use, an additional evaluation will be noted about 
whether the service allows for retaining the changes made to both files or if some data 
must be lost. 
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10. Find a Specific File within a Large Hierarchy of Files 
Users often need to find files amid a large and intricate, often unorganized, folder 
hierarchy.  This task again presents the user with a folder hierarchy containing over 3,000 
files and asks them to find a specified folder and file.  This task evaluates the file retrieval 
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V. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY DEMONSTRATION 
Chapter IV described a methodology for evaluating the usability and security of 
cloud-based file sharing technologies, using a combination of heuristics evaluation and 
task-based cognitive walkthrough.  This chapter demonstrates how to conduct an 
evaluation using this methodology and provides recommendations for assessing the 
results. For this demonstration, we have chosen to evaluate three of the more popular 
cloud-based technologies as possible solutions to meet the file sharing needs of DoD 
users.  
A.  TECHNOLOGIES TO BE EVALUATED 
1. Dropbox 
Dropbox (https://www.dropbox.com) is the most popular web-based file sharing 
service, according to its Alexa rank of 168 (https://www.alexa.com).  Simplicity and ease 
of use are two of Dropbox’s heavily marked benefits.  There are currently over 50 million 
users of Dropbox (Dropbox, 2012), including employees from 87% of Fortune 100 firms 
(Schadler, Brown, & Martyn, 2011).  In a study of the mobility affordances of several 
collaboration services, Forrester Research recommends Dropbox as a “Strong Performer” 
in the mobile collaboration space (Schadler et al., 2011).   
Dropbox was chosen for its exceptional simplicity and ease-of-use in syncing, 
storing and sharing files.  Too often, however, ease-of-use tends to limit the security or 
functionality of an IT solution.  Including Dropbox in this evaluation will help determine 
if the service delivers on its promise of usability as well as providing for the basic 
security needs of DoD users.  
2. Google Drive 
Google Drive (https://drive.google.com) is a file sharing system that also provides 
users an entire suite of web-hosted office productive software that supports multiple 
collaboration models.  In additional to basic file storage and sharing, this software 
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improves upon collaboration by adding the capability for synchronous file editing within 
its web-hosted applications, allowing users to work simultaneously on the same 
document.  The service also allows inline messaging between contributors to further 
enhanced collaboration.  
Google Drive is provided as an enterprise service as part of Google Apps for 
Business.  Google (2012a) claims that over 5 million government and businesses 
currently use Google Apps for Business including U.S. General Services Administration 
(GSA), Genetech, and the city of Los Angeles (Schalder et al., 2011).  Forrester Research 
recommends Google Docs as a “Strong Performer” in the mobile collaboration space 
(Schalder et al., 2011).  
Google Drive’s was chosen for comparison because of it added collaborative 
functionality over Dropbox, which makes it appealing for highly collaborative 
environments like the DoD.  Including it in this evaluation will help determine if usability 
and security is maintained despite the added functionality.  
3. Box 
Box (https://www.box.com) provides enterprise-level security and administration 
tools in addition to file sharing.  Like Dropbox, Box promises users a simple and 
powerful way “to access and share their content from anywhere” (Box, 2012, 
Reinventing how the world uses business content, para. 1).  Box also promises seamless 
integration with a wealth of enterprise services like SharePoint, Active Directory, and 
Microsoft Office as well as Google Drive’s office productivity software to enable 
synchronous file collaboration. Additionally, Box provides numerous enterprises level 
security and administration features, with finer granularity than Dropbox and Google 
Drive.   
Box claims that over 10 million individuals, small businesses and Fortune 500 
companies currently use their service (Box, 2012).   Forrester Research recommends Box 
over Dropbox and Google Docs as a “Leader” in the mobile collaboration space with the 
highest rankings among the services it evaluated (Schadler et al., 2011).  Including Box 
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in this evaluation will determine if its usability and security can keep up with its added 
functionality and enterprise-level service integration. 
B.  HEURISTICS EVALUATION 
This section evaluates each of the cloud-based technologies using the heuristics 
developed in chapter IV of this thesis.  This method of evaluation utilizes questions, 
listed first in Table 3 and reiterated in Table 6, to assess whether a particular technology 
implements the principles of a heuristic.  Each question elicits a “yes” response when the 
principle is followed and a “no” response when it is not.  Table 6 presents the results of 
our heuristics evaluation method for the chosen technologies.  Each heuristic, with its 
applicable questions, is shown on the left-hand column.  The response to each question, 
i.e., whether the technology implements the principle of the question, is shown by a “Y” 
in the appropriate right-hand column.  Empty cells, indicating the technology does not 
implement the particular principle of the heuristic, are highlighted with a red border for 
visual significance.  
The heuristics evaluation is a relatively efficient and effective way to determine if 
a specific technology adheres to usability and security principles.  The resulting table for 
such an evaluation shows, at a glance, the compliance and non-compliance of each 
technology, allowing decision makers within an organization the ability to determine 























   Are  universal  identifiers  (e.g.,  e‐mail  addresses)  used  for  identifying  individuals  for  access  control  and  sharing 
purposes? 
Y  Y  Y 
Can identities be incorporated with PKI authentication for single sign‐on purposes?     Y  Y 
Do the access controls provide read‐only and read‐write restrictions?  Y  Y  Y 
Are the access controls reasonable simple, not much more complex than read‐only and read‐write?  Y  Y  Y 
Is DAC enforced by requiring users to explicitly restrict access to files or folders when sharing them?          
2. Appearance:  Present a familiar and minimal appearance that is consistent with platform conventions 
   Is the web interface presented as a file system DoD users are likely to be familiar with?  Y  Y  Y 
Are terms and controls presented in natural language and consistent with platform conventions?     Y    
Are frequently used controls visible to users (e.g., not hidden under other commands)?        Y 
Does the interface adequately remove information and controls that are not needed for the tasks at hand?  Y  Y  Y 
3. Cognitive Friction: Reduce cognitive friction by removing sharing inhibitors and providing shortcuts and the ability to group collaborators 
   Can users perform the primary functionalities of file sharing with only e‐mail and a web browsers?  Y  Y  Y 
Are the restrictions on file types and sizes unlimited, or reasonably large  Y       
Does the system provide shortcuts for experienced users?  Y  Y  Y 
Does the system support logical grouping of collaborators?          
4. Error Reduction:  Interfaces should reduce human error through the principle of  least privilege, effective warning messages, and clearly marked 
exits 
   Is the principle of least privilege enforced by disabling access to files by default?  Y  Y    
Are warning/help messages expressed in plain language and provide understandable guidance to the user?  Y  Y  Y 
Do warning messages stop users before permanently deleting files?  Y     Y 
Do warning messages stop users before sharing private files with others?          
Are undo and redo mechanisms clearly and easily available for error‐prone actions?  Y  Y    
5. Security Feedback:  Increase user awareness through security related feedback and auditing 
   Are auditing mechanisms available  that  show what  files &  folders have been  shared, with whom, and with what 
restrictions? 
Y  Y  Y 
     >Is this auditing available in a single view?  Y       
Are auditing mechanisms available to see who has made changes to a file?  Y  Y  Y 
Are automatic feedback notifications provided to alert collaborators when files are initially shared with them?  Y  Y  Y 
Are automatic feedback notifications provided to alert collaborators when shared files have been updated?  Y     Y 
6. Data Ownership:  Provide a strong sense of ownership through delegation and revocability 
   Is ownership maintained and visible when a file is shared on the service?  Y  Y  Y 
Can ownership of files be delegated to others?          
Is a mechanism provided to revoke access to updated versions of a file?  Y  Y  Y 
7. Automatic Versioning:  Provide mechanisms for automatic versioning and conflict resolution 
   Is a mechanism provided for automatic version control by default?  Y  Y  Y 
Is a mechanism provided to automatically manage inconsistent versions of a file without data loss?  Y  Y  Y 
8. Reference Links:  Utilize the benefits of e‐mail through reference links 
   Are mechanisms in place to share files via reference links over e‐mail?  Y  Y  Y 
Are tools available to e‐mail links to files from within the service  Y  Y  Y 
9. Ubiquitous Access: Access to files should be available online, offline, and across popular OSs and Devices 
   Is access to files automatically available on Windows and Macintosh OSs when access to the Internet is interrupted?  Y       
Is access to files available through a web interface with Internet access?  Y  Y  Y 
Is access to files available on IOS and Android mobile Oss with an Internet connection?  Y  Y  Y 




Is data encrypted with SSL 256 during transfer?  Y  Y  Y 
Is data at rest encrypted with AES 256?  Y     Y 
Can data owners maintain exclusive control of the encryption key so the service does not have access to their data?          
Is the service compliant with any industry recognized standards regulations?     Y  Y 
Is the service compliant with FedRAMP regulations?          
Table 6.   Heuristics evaluation results 
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C.  COGNITIVE WALKTHROUGH 
As stated earlier, a heuristics evaluation shows if a technology employs the 
principles of each heuristic, but it does not indicate how usable the technology is.  For the 
latter, a cognitive walkthrough is a good complement to a heuristics evaluation.   
As described in Chapter II of this thesis, the cognitive walkthrough methodology 
is used to evaluate the “ease-of-learning” of a system’s interface.  The walkthrough takes 
a given task, and seeks to:  
consider, in sequence, each of the user actions needed to accomplish the 
task.  For each action, the analysts try to tell a story about a typical user’s 
interaction with the interface.  They ask what the user would be trying to 
do at this point and what actions the interface makes available. (Wharton 
et al., 1994, p. 3) 
Inputs to the walkthrough will be the personas developed in Chapter IV of this 
thesis (see Table 4), representing the users to be evaluated, and several of the tasks 
defined in Chapter IV (see Table 5), as “sample tasks for evaluation” (Wharton et al., 
1994, p. 2).  The walkthroughs for each of these tasks are described in the following 
sections.  Each section summarizes the task and the usability it seeks to evaluate, 
followed by a detailed design description of the interface elements necessary for 
completing the task.  Following this introduction, each persona’s interactions with the 
technology are described to “uncover design errors that would interfere” (Wharton et al., 
1994, p. 4) with the respective persona’s ability to learn and use the interfaces.   
While performing a cognitive walkthrough can be costly both in time, money, and 
human resources, our methodology uses the results of the heuristics evaluation to narrow 
the list of alternatives that warrant further consideration for a cognitive walkthrough. 
Organizations should use the heuristics evaluation table to determine the appropriate 
tradeoffs between the usability and security required by their organization, and select 
from only the most promising technologies for further evaluation.   
We previously determined that Dropbox provides a good balance of security and 
usability for our example organization, and therefore Dropbox was used to demonstrate 
how a cognitive walkthrough could be used to evaluate this technology.  As this chapter 
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is intended solely as a demonstration, only tasks 3 through 5 from Table 5 will be 
analyzed here.  These tasks were chosen because they represent the most security-focused 
of the ten tasks described in Chapter IV, and therefore exhibit the usability of Dropbox’s 
primary security-relevant interface elements.  
Figure 6 shows Dropbox’s main interface.  Boxes are drawn to highlight the key 
areas that will be referenced in the interface descriptions throughout the walkthroughs. 
 
Figure 6.   Dropbox’s primary interface 
1. Task 3: Share a File or Folder with Co-workers with Specific Rights 
This task evaluates how easily a user can share a file with a collaborator and 
restrict access to that file, by requiring each persona to share a given file with two 
coworkers and delegate different permission levels to each.  Like many similar services, 
Dropbox provides both read-only and read-write access; however, unlike most other 
sharing technologies, it separates these two access modes into completely different 
workflows, each with their own UI and terminology.   
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Dropbox never uses the term read-only access in its interface, but provides the 
ability to grant such rights.  In place of read-only, the term links is used as a method to 
provide other users access to view files.  Sharing a file or folder with read-only access is 
done using the Get Link button.  The Get Link button is hidden by default, but appears in 
the contextual menu bar (Figure 7) once a file or folder is selected, represented as a chain 
links icon with the label Get Link.  Clicking on this button allows the user to provide a 
read-only link to other users to view the document or folder; other users cannot make 
changes through this link.  Links can be given to anyone with an e-mail address; they 
need not be authenticated by Dropbox to view the file.  Dropbox also does not provide 
the ability to restrict read-only rights to individuals once granted, meaning anyone who 
has a link to the file can view it once it has been shared in this manner, even if the owner 
did not explicitly share the link with them.  
Figure 7.   Contextual menu bar for a selected file 
Dropbox also never uses the term read-write access in its interface, but does 
provide tools to grant such access.  To grant read-write access, it uses inconsistent terms 
such as inviting others to a folder, collaborating on a folder, or sharing folders.  Such 
read-write permissions are only possible at the folder level on Dropbox, and not available 
for individual files.  Once granted read-write permissions, collaborators have full control 
of anything within that folder (including the ability to add, delete, and modify files).  
Dropbox does not provide more granular restrictions on individual file access or different 
access modes; it provides either all or nothing. Granting read-write permission to a folder 
is accomplished by clicking on the Invite to folder icon (a blue folder overlaid with a 
rainbow) that appears on the contextual menu bar after selecting the chosen folder 
(Figure 8).   
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Users can also share read-write access to a folder by clicking on the same icon in 
the top menu bar.  This presents a wizard that guides the user to choose a folder to share, 
or create a new shared folder.  Unlike the read-only permissions on a folder, read-write 
permissions on a folder are restricted to only those who are explicitly granted access to 
the folder. 
Read-only and read-write are the only access modes available within Dropbox.  
More advanced modes (i.e., execute or write-only) are not available.  
Figure 8.   Contextual menu bar options for a selected folder 
All methods of sharing a file or folder, regardless of read-only or read-write, 
utilize a wizard (Figure 9) that guides the user through providing e-mail addresses of 
other users with whom to share the file or folder.  The wizard provides an optional 
message to accompany the invitation. Once sent, a feedback message, Sent successfully, 




Figure 9.   Share file or folder wizard 
The following sections detail the interactions of each of our personas when 
accomplishing this task:   
a. Alice, the Inexperienced Commander’s Secretary 
Alice is not very familiar with the traditional verbiage used for read-only 
and read-write permission levels, so the absence of these terms in Dropbox will not 
impact her.  However, Dropbox does not use consistent terms to address these two 
capabilities and the multiple terms used (e.g., links, view, collaborate, invite, share) make 
her confused as to exactly what access she is granting to others.  Only the term share 
relates directly to this task, but it is not used in Dropbox to label the tools used to 
accomplish this task (e.g., Get Link and Invite to folder).  Having two separate workflows 
to accomplish the different kinds of sharing will cause a moderate amount of cognitive 
friction for her, since she must think about what level of permission she wants to give 
before she starts the sharing process.  Minimal training, or significant trial-and-error, will 
be required for Alice to understand how Dropbox distinguishes between read-only and 
read-write access modes and how to apply them.  
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Once she finds and learns the proper tools, however, their placement is 
visible and consistent in the interface, and the steps required to share a file are simple and 
few.  The pop-up window that results from both sharing methods provides dialog that is 
simple yet informative enough to guide Alice quickly through the process and ensure she 
knows which file or folder she is sharing.  She only needs to know the e-mail addresses 
of those she wants to share the file with.  The immediate feedback provided by the 
interface tells her that she has completed the task successfully.  Learning this task 
initially will be highly difficult for Alice, but once learned the tools are highly useable 
and Alice can perform repeat the task easily. 
b. Bob, the Seasoned NCOIC 
Bob, like Alice, must wrestle with the distinctions Dropbox places on 
read-only and read-write access.  Unlike Alice, he is familiar with the concepts of read-
only and read-write to describe access permissions, so mapping these concepts to 
Dropbox’s inconsistently used terms results in only moderate cognitive friction for him.  
He is also familiar with the convention of applying the different permission levels 
through a single workflow, so he must translate his conventions into two separate 
workflows.  As with Alice, this can be learned through minimal training or trial-and-
error.  Bob learns the concepts with less time-consuming trial-and-error than Alice, due 
to his familiarity with computers, but minimal training would still help explain how to 
apply the different access modes appropriately as it is not apparent in the interface.  
Like Alice, Bob will be able to easily use the tools once the distinctions 
have been learned.  The dialog in the wizard is simple yet informative enough for him to 
feel confident in knowing which file he is sharing, and with whom.  He especially 
appreciates the automatic look-up Dropbox performs when he shares a file with a co-
worker he has previously shared, with as this feature saves him valuable time.  The 
feedback generated once a file or folder is shared also builds his confidence that he has 
completed the task successfully.  Bob can learn this task with moderate difficulty on the 
first try, but the high usability of the tool once learned enables him successfully repeat the 
task easily.    
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c. Chris, the Tech-savvy Young Airman 
Though he is normally very technically savvy, the different workflows for 
applying different permissions will initially be difficult for Chris for the same reasons 
they were for Alice and Bob.  Chris’ background with computer jargon and his 
exploration of several emerging web-based system will help him to understand the 
distinctions quickly through minimal training or limited trial-and-error.   Once learned, 
Chris can easily and reliably repeat the task successfully.  The ease of learning this task 
for Chris is still a cause of friction, but the high usability makes proficiency easy for him 
to achieve after minor initial effort.   
2. Task 4: Determine which Files and Folders are Being Shared 
This task evaluates the availability, visibility, and usability of feedback tools by 
requiring the persona to determine which of their files and folders are being shared with 
others.  Dropbox excels at this task by presenting everything a user has shared with 
anybody within a two views: the Links view shows all files and folders shared with read-
only access and the Sharing view shows all folders shared with read-write access.  
The Links button allows users to see all the files and folders they have shared with 
read-only access.  The Links button is found in the left menu bar (Figure 6), and is 
represented by a chain links icon with the label Links.  Once clicked, the resulting page 
(Figure 10) lists all the files that are being shared with read-only access with when they 
were created, and provides a remove button that will revoke the read-only access.  The 
page does not show whom a file is being shared with, since read-only access is provided 
to anyone with a link to the file.  To increase learnability, this view provides a concise 
description of how Dropbox manages links in a caption above the list of files. 
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Figure 10.   Links view shows all files and folders shared with read-only access 
The Sharing view provides the user the ability to see information on folders being 
shared with read-write access, and is accessible by clicking on the Sharing button (with 
rainbow icon) in the left menu bar (Figure 6).  The resulting page (Figure 11) lists all the 
folders being shared with read-write access, and the users each folder is being shared 
with.  This view also displays when the last file within the folder was modified, and 
provides an options button to see additional details on who has access to the folder, or to 
grant or revoke access to the folder.  To aid learnability, this view provides a concise 
statement in a caption at the top describing how the sharing of folders is accomplished in 
Dropbox. 
Figure 11.   Sharing view shows all folders shared with read-write access   
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Further, Dropbox provides visual cues that the files and folders are shared across 
its interface.  A chain linked icon appears next to files and folders where read-only access 
has been granted, and a folder icon overlaid with the outline of two people replaces the 
standard blank folder icon on a folder that has been shared with read-write access.  When 
clicking on a shared folder, the contextual menu bar provides a Shared folder options 
button (Figure 12) that displays a list of users with access to the shared folder and 
provides the ability to e-mail collaborators, revoke their access (kick out) or delegate 
ownership (Figure 13). 
Figure 12.   Contextual menu bar for selected folder that has already been shared 
 




In evaluating the usability of this task, we assume the personas have learned the 
distinctions between Dropbox’s read-only and read-write access permissions before 
attempting the task.  The following sections detail the interactions of each of our personas 
while accomplishing this task:   
a. Alice, the Inexperienced Commander’s Secretary 
Alice will initially have a difficult time with this task because of the way 
Dropbox separates the ability to see what she is sharing via the two permission modes 
into different views.  This requires Alice to think about how she has shared a file or 
folder in the first place (e.g., with read-only or read-write access).  The inconsistent 
terms used also add to her cognitive friction.  For example, all files that were shared 
using the Get link button will show up on the Links view, which maps well to Alice’s 
intuition.  But all folders shared using the Invite to folder button show up on the Sharing 
view.  Additionally, having two separate views to see her shared files will initially lead to 
friction, as she must search across two views to find the file or folder she has shared.  It is 
easy for her to switch views, thought, if she does not find the information she is looking 
for.  These difficulties are minor for Alice and she can easily learn the distinctions 
through minimal trial-and-error.  The concise descriptions at the top of each view help 
Alice become more familiar with the distinctions between the two views as well as how 
Dropbox implements read-only and read-write permissions differently.  This aids her 
learnability of this task.  
The fact that the Links view does not mimic the Sharing view in providing 
a list of users each file or folder has been shared with causes Alice additional frustration.  
This is, of course, because Dropbox does not restrict view access to the individuals that 
received the e-mail; anyone with a link to a file or folder with read-only access can see it.  
But this distinction is not apparent in the view, and will cause Alice frustration since she 
cannot see whom she has sent the links to.  Alice can learn this task with minimal 
difficulty, and the usability of the tools, once learned, is very simple and allows her to 
repeat the task with ease.  
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b. Bob, the Seasoned NCOIC 
Like Alice, the inconsistent labels placed on the buttons to share a file or 
folder, and the buttons to see which file or folder has been shared, will be a source of 
initial confusion for Bob.  However, since the icons for the coinciding buttons are 
consistent (though the labels are not), Bob will easily be able to follow the consistency of 
the icons (rather than the inconsistent labels) to determine which method of sharing 
corresponds with which view. He enjoys the usability provided by the views, which 
allows him to see all shared files in a single view.  No other file sharing solutions he has 
worked with over his career incorporate such a single view, and trying to figure out what 
he is personally sharing has historically been a time-consuming chore.  
The lack of ability to see with whom a read-only link has been shared will 
also cause Bob initial confusion and frustration, as it is not apparent why this is not 
possible.  As the interface does not explain this shortcoming, Bob will end up using 
shared folders more often, since they provide the visibility he needs while sharing files.  
c.  Chris, the Tech-Savvy Young Airman 
Chris, who is familiar with trying new user interfaces, will easily learn the 
methods for accomplishing this task through minimal trial-and-error.  The inconsistent 
terms used for labeling the buttons will not be a problem for him, since the button icons 
correspond to other similar tasks.  Finding the proper views for his needs, and using 
them, will be simple for him.  He will be a slightly frustrated that he cannot see with 
whom he has shared a read-only link, but will accept this as a limitation of the service. 
3. Task 5: Audit Collaborators’ Actions on a File  
This task evaluates the availability, visibility, and usability of auditing tools by 
requiring the persona to determine who has made changes to a shared file.  Since 




adjusted to audit the changes on a file within a shared folder.  Dropbox provides two 
methods to accomplish this task; either by reviewing a file’s revision history, or through 
the use of the Events view. 
Dropbox automatically saves each version of a file and provides the revision 
history by clicking on the Previous versions button under the More button in the 
contextual menu bar (Figure 7).  The resulting page (Figure 14) lists all previous versions 
of the file, attributes each version to the collaborator who made the change, and displays 
when the change was made.  The user can also restore a previous version of a file from 
this page.  
 
Figure 14.   File version history view 
The Events view lists all changes made across all files within a Dropbox 
hierarchy, and attributes the change to the respective collaborator.  The Events view is 
accessed by clicking the Events button in the left menu bar of the main interface (Figure 
15).  A folder dropdown tool in the menu bar of this view provides the ability to filter the 
changes by a particular shared folder.  A calendar dropdown tool allows filtering the 
results by a particular day.   
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Figure 15.   Events view lists all the changes made across all files and folders 
The following sections detail the interactions of each of our personas while 
accomplishing this task:   
a. Alice, the Inexperienced Commander’s Secretary 
Alice will not be able to accomplish this task using the Previous versions 
method for a two reasons.  First, Alice’s intuition would not naturally tell her that the 
required steps to complete this task are found under a file’s revision history.  Second, the 
Previous versions button is not only hidden within the contextual menu bar and only 
visible when a file is selected, but also is hidden under the More button of the contextual 
menu bar.  Alice will search the interface for a tool that relates to this task, but will not be 
able to find one. 
After some searching, Alice may come across the Events button.  The 
word Events does not intuitively relate to the task for Alice, but the concise description 
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found at the top of the view explains that this view provides the information she is 
looking for.  This view is easy to find, simple in its presentation of information, and 
provides the information Alice needs to see exactly what has been changed across all her 
files recently.  While the first method to accomplish this task would be extremely 
difficult to learn, the Events view is easy to find and presents the required information in 
a simple, unified page.  This view provides easy learnability and high usability for her. 
b. Bob, the Seasoned NCOIC 
Bob understands that he should be looking for the revision history for a 
file to complete this task, but, like Alice, he will have significant difficulty finding what 
he needs buried under the More button.  He will easily find, however, the Events view, 
and will be pleased to see that it provides the information he needs on one consolidated 
page.  He must visit the page a few times, since the name Events was not an intuitive 
match for him to relate to this task, and, like many IT users, he does not read sentence 
length text on a page unless required (Krug, 2006).  After minor trial-and-error, and 
finally reading the page description, he is able to use the information provided by the 
page to accomplish the task.   
c. Chris, the Tech-savvy Young Airman 
Chris will find the Previous versions button with moderate ease through 
his skills and experience exploring user interfaces.  Unlike Bob and Alice, he 
immediately tries the More button to see what other functionality is available through the 
service.  The presentation of previous versions that results is simple and clear enough for 
him to understand. 
Chris will also quickly find the Events page as he explores the new user 
interface.  Like Bob, he does not read much of the text description for the page, so it 
takes him a couple visits to correctly identify the purpose of the page for accomplishing 
the task.  Chris finds both methods of auditing changes done to a file relatively easy to 
learn and quick to use.  In particular, he likes the granularity the filters on the Events 
view provide for narrowing his search. 
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D. FINDINGS 
As the heuristics evaluation and cognitive walkthroughs are conducted, notes 
should be taken on findings relevant to the organization for consideration of results not 
immediately apparent.  This section presents a sample of the findings of this example 
evaluation, as well as a summary of the results from the cognitive walkthrough. 
1.  Good Usability and Security Findings 
 Google Drive and Box both provide Single Sign-On capabilities with the 
incorporation of Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)-based 
APIs that integrate with an organization’s existing means of 
authentication.  Single Sign-On can be integrated with current PKI 
certificates for use within the DoD.   
 While all three technologies provided some level of notifying data owners 
and collaborators of changes made to documents, Box allows far more 
granular control of these notifications.  This granularity allows users to 
immediately see if someone downloaded, uploaded, commented on, 
previewed, or deleted something from folders they owned, or folders they 
are sharing and to switch each type of notification on or off as needed. 
 Google Drive and Box provides robust tools for an administrator to 
manage a user’s settings and activity within the enterprise. 
 Box provides mechanisms to further restrict shared folder access by 
setting a password on the folder and an expiration date for when the folder 
access will automatically be revoked. 
 Box and Google Drive allow collaborators to make comments on files to 
enhance collaboration. 
 Dropbox provides a LAN sync feature that allows file synchronization to 
occur locally between devices within the same LAN without requiring the 
file to traverse the Internet to the cloud servers, thus avoiding bandwidth 
and latency issues.  
 Box reports to have been issued an SSAE 16 type II report certifying they 
maintain high security practices for storing and handling user’s data. 
 Google reports their Google Apps for Government offering (which 
includes Google Drive) has received an authority to operate at the FISMA-
Moderate level with a Low operational risk level (Google, 2012b). 
 Though none of the solutions have a current FedRAMP security 
authorization, Box is reportedly pursuing this certification.  
 76
2.  Bad Usability and Security Findings 
 Box offers many additional sharing and collaboration features over Box 
and Google Drive, but this added functionality tends to increase the 
cognitive friction and reduce the usability of the product.   
 Box and Dropbox save each upload as a new version to avoid 
inconsistencies.  In highly collaborative environments, this means that if 
two users make changes and save different versions of the same file at the 
same time, two versions of the file will be created.  All the data will be 
saved, but the collaborators will have to manually merge the 
inconsistencies between the two files.  Google Drive allows users to work 
on the same document simultaneously, so inconsistencies are very rare.   
 Box, by default, automatically provides read-only access to any folder and 
file added to the service.  Anyone with a link will be able to access it 
without the owner explicitly sharing it.  This default setting can be 
changed within the settings. 
 Each service stores deleted files in a trash location for users to recover.  If 
deleted from this trash location, Dropbox and Google Drive delete the file 
permanently (may take time to propagate through their servers) while Box 
makes the file recoverable for 30 more days before it becomes 
unrecoverable.   
 Google Drive’s office productivity suite is only available online.  If using 
these proprietary document file types to allow for synchronous file editing, 
they will not be accessible when a connection to the Internet is 
unavailable.  The only current exception is by installing a plugin for the 
Chrome browser.  Offline access to Google Drive documents is not 
available on any other browser.   
 Google Drive provides rich automatic versioning features for its 
proprietary document types only.  Other document types common within 
the DoD (e.g., .pdf, .doc, .xls) are uploaded as completely separate 
documents and retain no version history. 
 When sharing files or folders, all the services default to grant full access 
rights to collaborators.  If less permission is desired, the user needs to 
explicitly change the default.  No warning messages are given to warn that 
full access is being granted.  
 Dropbox keeps a cache of previously used e-mail addresses for 
collaborators to provide “auto-fill” capabilities when sharing with frequent 
collaborators.  However, Dropbox does not provide a means of clearing 
this cache of e-mail address 
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3.  Cognitive Walkthrough Findings 
The learnability of Dropbox’s interface is hindered by the way it differentiates 
between read-only and read-write access modes.  Cognitive friction would affect all our 
personas, as they wrestled with understanding these distinctions.  While the distinctions 
are easy enough to understand once explained, they are not apparent when using the 
interface.  Dropbox provides a video tutorial that provides a basic overview of the service 
but does not walkthrough any of the user interfaces.  To find additional written and video 
tutorials explaining the distinctions between how Dropbox implements read-only and 
read-write access modes, one must search through a hierarchy of links under the Help 
menu.  Alice had the most difficult challenges figuring out how to implement the 
security-related tasks.  Bob was able to figure these out on his own, but the initial 
frustration made him weary of sharing files since he was not completely sure if he was 
sharing them appropriately.  Chris suffered the least frustration, as he was able to grasp 
the new conventions quickly through good trial-and-error skills, and by his familiarity 
with similar systems and tools. 
Dropbox also uses inconsistent labels on its tools for sharing files and folder, and 
for auditing which files/folders are being shared, which added to the cognitive friction 
associated with using the tools.  This friction decreased the learnability for the security-
relevant tools within Dropbox.  To ensure users are effectively using the service, a short 
tutorial should be provided to explain the unique access control conventions Dropbox 
uses in order to increase learnability, and the reliability that the security-related tools will 
be used appropriately.  Some tasks can be learned through trial-and-error, but users like 
Alice and Bob may require so much that frustration leads them to use the tools insecurely 
(provide read-only access to everything) or resort to less secure technology, such as e-
mail or USB drives.  
Once these few initially difficult concepts were understood, the tools provided by 
Dropbox were found to be highly usable.  All tasks required very few steps, tools were 
consistently placed across the site and easy to find and use, and the appearance of the site 
was familiar to users and presented minimal distractions.  On average, Bob and Alice 
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found it only moderately difficult (Chris found it easy) to initially locate the tools 
required to accomplish tasks.  However, once found, the consistent and simple interface 
made it very easy for all the personas to repeat tasks successfully.  Dropbox increased 
user confidence through immediate and simple feedback following most user actions, and 
decreased user error by providing the ability to easily undo most of those actions.  The 
views provided to see what files and folders users have shared, as well as audit who has 
modified shared files within a single view, saved users time and increased their security 
awareness.  Overall, after a short and marginally difficult learning period, Dropbox’s 
functionality and user interface could provide a robust, simple solution for DoD users to 
share files in a usably secure manner.    
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VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
A. CONCLUSION 
Success in today’s information-dependent society hinges on the ability for 
members of an organization to share information.  With regard to security, this involves 
both the need to share information files with co-workers, as well as to restrict access to 
the information from those who do not need it.  Cyber threats from both inside and 
outside the organization seek to circumvent security measures resulting in the 
exploitation of valuable information.   
The majority of research done to better understand the nature of cyber threats has 
focused on outside attackers and malicious insiders.  Far less research has been dedicated 
to non-malicious insiders, and overlooking this threat can be a great risk to the 
organization.  Many organizations, including the DoD, may downplay this non-malicious 
insider threat thinking that the impact is insignificant.  This thesis has used historical 
analyses and other research to show that the non-malicious insider threat leads to far 
more organizational data breaches than malicious insiders and is even more prevalent 
than the threat from outside attackers, particularly in the government sector (Cisco, 2008; 
Lynch, 2006; Open Security Foundation, 2011; Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2011).  
Even if leaked data is not intercepted and exploited by an outside enemy, the indirect 
costs associated with cleaning-up after non-malicious insider data breaches, including the 
time, money, and resources required to administratively sanitize computers and networks 
after a breach, contacting leaked PII victims and providing remediation, as well as the 
loss of public reputation once a leak is reported, can be high. 
This thesis started with the premise that the poor usability of existing file sharing 
systems contributes to the non-malicious insiders inadvertently compromise information.    
Additionally, when the security features of an IT system are too difficult to use, well-




security in IT systems have traditionally been viewed as conflicting goals.  HCI-SEC 
research has focused on properly aligning both usability and security to achieve truly 
secure system (Garfinkel, 2005).   
Sharing files is a daily task for IT users within highly collaborative organizations 
like the DoD.  Users must collaborate with co-workers, and even share files with 
themselves for later access from a different location.  While numerous options are 
available within the DoD for sharing files (i.e., e-mail, shared folders), these legacy 
systems are either not secure, not usable, or neither secure nor usable.  This lack of usable 
security exacerbates the non-malicious insider threat to DoD information systems.  As a 
consequence, unintended data breaches resulting from this threat degrade the security 
posture of DoD networks.  This thesis has described the emergence of cloud-based file 
sharing technologies, and how they provide numerous usability benefits to IT users while 
promising highly secure environments.  These benefits include global and ubiquitous 
access to files from any location or computing platform with Internet access, local 
syncing of files for access during connectivity loss, automatic off-site storage and 
backup, automatic version control, and simple access control restrictions. 
In 2010, the federal government mandated a “Cloud-first” shift in its IT 
management “using commercial cloud technologies where feasible” (Kundra, 2010, p. 7).  
Additionally, the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) 
has advised the President of the United States that cloud-based file sharing capabilities, 
including Document Collaboration, Project Coordination, and Data Archiving and 
Storage, are “mission functions which appear most attractive for cloud migration” and 
“should be considered for earliest programmatic action” (2012, p. 45).  To make this 
strategy a reality, the federal government has implemented security assessments 
processes, like FedRAMP, to assess the security practices of a CSP and authorize their 
technology for official use.  While these assessments certify the security practices of a 
CSP’s back-end data storage and handling, they do not evaluate the usability an end-user 
will expect to find while using the CSP’s service. 
This thesis develops a methodology that organizations, like the DoD, can use to 
evaluate the usability and security of cloud-based file sharing services from the end-user 
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perspective.  This methodology adapts and combines the concepts of heuristics evaluation 
(Nielson, 2005a) and cognitive walkthrough (Wharton et al. 1994).  The heuristics 
evaluation assesses whether a cloud-based file sharing technology implements critical 
usability and security principles, and the cognitive walkthrough determines how usably 
the technology implements these features.   
The heuristics used for this evaluation are based on the recommendations of 
numerous researchers from the HCI and HCI-SEC communities, and are specifically 
tailored for the usability and security of cloud-based file sharing systems.  Questions are 
derived from each heuristic to objectively evaluate if the technology implements the 
principles of a heuristic.  As no solution provides the perfect balance of usability and 
security, the results from this evaluation allow organizational decision makers to 
determine the appropriate tradeoffs between the competing goals for their organization, 
and narrow the list of alternatives to those which provide the best balance of security and 
usability principles. 
The cognitive walkthroughs employ the use of personas (Cooper, 2004) and tasks 
(Wharton et al., 1994) to evaluate the learnability and ultimate usability of a cloud-based 
file sharing technology’s interface.  Three personas were defined to represent a range of 
IT users within the DoD.  Ten tasks were defined to represent the tasks DoD users likely 
to perform a daily basis.   
Finally, this thesis has demonstrated the use of our methodology through an 
evaluation of three popular cloud-based file sharing technologies: Dropbox, Google 
Drive, and Box.  The heuristics evaluation helped determine that Dropbox provided the 
best implementation of usability and security for our demonstration and, therefore, 
warranted further evaluation by cognitive walkthrough.  The cognitive walkthrough 
determined that Dropbox’s security features are initially difficult to learn, but very usable 
once learned.  Learnability was hindered by the use of an unconventional method for 
applying read-only and read-write access modes through completely separate workflows, 
using inconsistent terms to label corresponding functions, and hiding relevant features 
from the user.  It was determined that these learnability issues could be resolved with 
minimal training.  Once learned, Dropbox displayed excellent usability qualities, 
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including a minimalist appearance, consistent placement of tools, consolidated auditing 
of important file sharing activity, immediate feedback following users’ actions, and the 
ability to easily undo most user actions.  Through a demonstration of the usability of its 
end-user interface, Dropbox is recommended as an exceptional solution for providing 
robust yet simple file sharing functionality to DoD users.   
Providing a highly usable tool to share files securely is vitally important to reduce 
the non-malicious insider’s motivation to circumvent an organizations security measures.   
The methodologies of this thesis have been developed with the DoD in mind; however, as 
the act of file sharing is common in highly collaborative corporate environments, the 
methodologies can appeal to many organizations seeking a solution for cloud-based file 
sharing.  The heuristics evaluation provides simple yet critical visibility into whether 
competing technologies implement important usability and security principles, tailored 
specifically for cloud-base file sharing systems.  The cognitive walkthrough complements 
the heuristics evaluation and provides valuable insight into how usable a technology will 
ultimately be for an organization’s users.  
B. POSSIBLE FUTURE WORK 
1. Formal Heuristics Analysis 
Using the heuristics developed in this thesis, valuable insight can be gained in a 
future study that formally analyzes the heuristics (including the questions that have been 
derived from them) in real-world situations to validate whether they provide the claimed 
results of better usability and security for the end-user.  
2. User Study 
This thesis used personas for the cognitive walkthrough demonstration.  There are 
a number of benefits in UI design for using personas rather actual users (Calabria, 2004; 
Cooper, 2004).  However, a field study of actual user interactions with the UI will help 
provide valuable insight into the usability of the security features of cloud-based file 
sharing technologies and validate the claims of this thesis for real-world use.   
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3. DoD-Specific Study 
The demonstration used in this thesis provides only an example evaluation using 
popular cloud-based alternatives and the IFs of a typical DoD organization.  As the DoD 
moves toward a real solution in the cloud, whether through an authorized CSP or 
developing their own on the DISA cloud, future work could include using the 
methodology of this thesis in an evaluation that is specifically tailored to actual DoD 
requirements. 
4. Back-end Security Affordances 
As this thesis focuses on the front-end usability and security (i.e., the UI 
affordances for the end user), follow-on research could include expanding the evaluation 
methodology to consider back-end security affordances like data security, administrator 
auditing capabilities, and whether the DoD could use commercially available 
technologies while hosting their own servers to maintain complete control over the 
information.   
5. Additional Technology Evaluations 
To demonstrate the methodology, this thesis only evaluated a few of Dropbox’s 
security features. Future work could involve a more comprehensive evaluation of 
Dropbox, Box, Google Drive, or any other cloud-based file sharing technologies that has 
relevance for the DoD.  Special attention should be paid to systems that would allow the 
DoD to host its own servers on a private cloud, or to encrypt data on the client, so that 
DoD data is never made available to the cloud provider.  Additionally, the extensive 
auditing tools provided by Box are very important in a DoD context and should be further 
evaluated. 
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